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The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan
M
ichigan has a problem. By several measures, 
the achievement of students attending its K–12 
educational system has not kept pace with other 
states. Although Michigan’s student achievement 
has improved over the past decade, the improvement has 
been modest, and achievement in many other states has 
easily surpassed that in Michigan. Furthermore, despite 
a funding system based on an equitable allocation of 
resources, Michigan has persistent gaps in achievement 
across income groups that have not narrowed over time. 
These trends have grave consequences for the future of 
Michigan’s children as well as for Michigan’s economy. 
Substantial evidence shows that sagging test scores lower 
the future earnings potential of individuals and slow the 
economic growth of states. We believe it is time to accelerate 
the state’s educational and economic progress. It is time 
Figure ES-1. Michigan and U.S. Math Scores on NAEP, by Year
for Michigan to begin to reclaim its legacy of educational 
excellence and equity.
Addressing Michigan’s education problem requires additional 
resources. After spending the past 12 months conducting an 
extensive literature review and analyzing national and state 
data, researchers at the Upjohn Institute have concluded 
that resources are key to student academic success. More 
resources are needed to reach higher levels of achievement 
and to close the gaps in achievement between students from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds. Unfortunately, the 
situation with resources is quite similar to the situation with 
student achievement. Michigan has been slowly increasing 
resources for students, but virtually all other states have 
increased their spending faster. Thus Michigan is losing 
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1 These calculations use very conservative assumptions. They rely on NAEP test scores for 2012, the relationship between test scores and lifetime earnings in 
Chetty et al. (2011), earnings of all individuals aged 16 to 80 in the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS), and a real discount rate of 3.0 percent. Present 
discounted values treat future earnings as less valuable than present earnings; that is, they are discounted to make them of comparable worth to today’s earnings. 
The rationale is that money today could be invested and worth more than the same amount in the future, even after accounting for inflation.
system investment. Figures ES-1 (Page ES-1) and ES-2 show 
how Michigan has ominously gone from above to below the 
national average in student achievement and total per-pupil 
revenue.
The Potential Economic Payoff
Michigan’s standing vis-à-vis other states is not just a 
matter of state pride. Michigan’s educational achievement 
disadvantages relative to the nation are sufficient to predict 
future earnings for Michigan students that are about 2 
percent below what they would be if Michigan’s test scores 
matched the national average. Two percent may sound 
minor, but a 2 percent disadvantage added up over a career 
is a significant amount of money. On average, the present 
discounted value of a worker’s earnings over her career is 
over $900,000, so 2 percent extra earnings would have a 
present value of over $18,000.1 Applying an $18,000 career 
earnings boost to each of the approximately 1.5 million K–12 
students in Michigan results in a potentially huge total state 
benefit: over $27 billion in the present value of extra career 
earnings for this group of students, and of course, as more 













































































Nationwide State Average Michigan
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core Data.


























grows even bigger. Thus there is a large economic stake to 
even small improvements in average academic achievement 
for Michigan’s students.2
Limited State Resources
Given that Michigan’s student achievement has lost ground 
compared to other states, and given the conclusion that 
more resources are needed to reach higher levels of 
achievement and to close the gaps, it would be easy to 
recommend that the state should appropriate significantly 
more funds in order to improve its K–12 system. However, 
that recommendation becomes difficult to make when one 
acknowledges that by many measures, Michigan is already 
among the leading states in the percentage of its fiscal 
capacity that gets spent on K–12 education. As a proportion 
of gross state product (GSP), the state spends more on 
K–12 education than any other states. The problem is 
that Michigan’s fiscal capacity to fund K–12 education has 
declined. Michigan’s GSP per capita has fallen from 23rd in 
1992 to 30th in 2011, and its growth rate over this time ranks 
49th among the states. 
In a nutshell, prior to the last two decades, Michigan was a 
relatively affluent state that spent a relatively high amount of 
its resources on K–12 education. The two recessions in the 
2000s—and Michigan’s lack of recovery between them—
and the decade-long restructuring of the auto industry 
devastated our state economy. So Michigan’s fiscal capacity 
has shrunk, but legacy costs and an apparent commitment 
to education meant that the share of its fiscal capacity that 
goes to education has stayed relatively high. 
Another Resource Issue 
Not only is the level of resources important, but how those 
resources are spent also influences student achievement. 
2As is widely recognized, higher education is a route to higher lifetime earnings. Ruggles et al. (2010) documents both the lag between the percent of the 
population age 25 and over with at least an associate’s degree in Michigan and the U.S. average, and that the size of the difference is growing. The current study 
does not specifically address higher education, but we would assert that it will be difficult to close the gap in higher education achievement between Michigan and 
the rest of the country when the gap in K–12 student achievement is widening.
3In our recommendations, we have used a target of an annual increase in the overall level of state funding of under $600 million. This would represent an 
increase of less than 7 percent in overall school funding. It is, of course, up to the legislature to find the means, but we would point out that recent news reports 
(http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/michigan/2015/02/18/michigan-business-tax-credit-liability/23614611/) suggest that annual costs of 
ongoing MEGA business tax credits will be $500 million to $600 million per year for the next 15 years.
We suggest that the use of 
resources in Michigan may be skewed. 
While Michigan ranks 26th in instructional 
expenditures per student, it ranks 40th in the 
percentage of K–12 revenue spent on instruction. Less 
than half of the revenue (from all sources) devoted to K–12 
education in our state goes to instruction. Legacy costs, 
student support services, and declining enrollments have 
reduced the proportion of educational resources that are 
available for instruction. Michigan ranks 6th in the share of 
expenditures going to both employee benefits and student 
support services, which takes away money that could be 
spent on instruction. Therefore, stakeholders in the Michigan 
K–12 system need to establish policies and incentives that 
direct more revenue to classroom instruction in order to 
boost student achievement.
A Conundrum and Potential Solutions
Michigan is left with a conundrum. It is time to stop trailing 
its competitor states, and we believe that to do so will 
require resources. But the resource base in the state is quite 
limited. We believe that there are three potential solutions. 
First, because the situation is so dire, the state needs to 
“dig deep” and find some additional state resources. In the 
recommendations that we enumerate below, we suggest that 
these additional resources should be invested in an array 
of targeted initiatives.3 Second, we think that the resources 
that are extended to districts could and should be directed 
to proven instructional programs/interventions. We have 
entitled our recommended competitive grant program Smart 
Educational Expenditure Demonstration (SEED) grants. 
These grants would be limited to programs that have proven 
research evidence of large educational results per dollar 
spent. 




The third solution to the conundrum of needing, but lacking, 
resources is to expand the resource base to local property. 
Currently, local school districts have no ability to increase 
funding through property taxes.4 Whereas the Common Core 
Data of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
reports that, in Michigan, 30 percent of total revenues come 
from local sources, it should be recognized that local districts 
have virtually no discretion over these funds. The 
state has limited the local funding to a 
millage rate of up to 18.0 mills on non-
homestead property, or in a very 
few districts to a hold harmless 
millage. As noted below, we 
recommend that proposal A 
should be amended to allow 
local districts to request 
voter approval for local 
millage enhancements that 
we believe should be subject 
to state equalization for 
property-value- poor districts. 
Furthermore, we advocate 
rigorous evaluation of the net 
impact of those funds on student 
achievement. 
Proposal A and Its Shortcomings
In addition to calling for more resources, we believe that 
the current funding mechanism in the state — Proposal A 
foundation grant plus categoricals — needs to be adjusted. 
Prior to the 1994–95 school year, Michigan districts were 
funded by local property taxes that were equalized by the 
state. In the 1993–94 school year, for example, the state 
guaranteed districts $102.50 per mill plus fixed-dollar 
payments per pupil of $400. In the 1994–95 school year, 
with the implementation of Proposal A, the state funding 
mechanism drastically changed to a foundation grant 
system. Under the foundation grant system, the state 
effectively sets two levels of operational funding per pupil: a 
guaranteed minimum, called the “effective basic foundation” 
grant, and a maximum level of support, called the “hold 
harmless threshold” level. 
Proposal A was not promulgated as a school improvement 
initiative per se. It did not have any regulations, incentives, 
or sanctions directed at teaching and learning. It 
was mainly intended to provide property 
tax relief and improved per-pupil 
funding equity. Of course, in 
accomplishing the latter, it 
produced relative “gainers” 
and “losers.” To the extent 
that student achievement 
depends on funding levels, 
then we would expect that 
Proposal A would have had 
differential (relative) effects 
on student achievement that 
would favor the “gainers.” 
Using Michigan Educational 
Assessment Program (MEAP) 
results over the years just before 
and just after the implementation of 
Proposal A, Professor Leslie Papke from 
Michigan State University showed that for each 
$1,000 increase in per-pupil spending, there was an increase 
of between 2.2 and 3.7 percentage points in the 4th grade 
math passing rate. When she looked at schools in lower-
spending districts that received greater funding increases 
after the implementation of Proposal A, the increase was 
between 3.2 and 10.3 percentage points; among schools in 
higher-spending districts, the increase was only between 1.3 
and 2.6 percentage points. The MEAP passing rates went up 
for all schools, on average, but the lower-spending districts’ 
schools were the relative “gainers” when they received the 
additional revenue.
Proposal A was mainly 
intended to provide property 
tax relief and improved 
per-pupil funding equity. Of 
course, in accomplishing the 
latter, it produced relative 
“gainers” and “losers.”  
ES-4
4Districts that comprise an intermediate school district (ISD) may ask voters in the ISD for an enhancement millage. Very few of these enhancement millages have 
succeeded because they require alignment of the needs and preferences of multiple districts that often have quite different needs and preferences. 
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In the first few years after Proposal A was implemented 
and Michigan’s economy was growing, all was well. Virtually 
all districts got annual funding increases and experienced 
increases in student achievement. Furthermore, interdistrict 
equity was being achieved as “poorer” districts got relatively 
larger state funding increases and had larger gains in student 
achievement. 
But in the 2000s, shortcomings in Proposal A’s funding 
mechanism became apparent. The state’s fiscal distress 
during this decade caused a rollback in the foundation 
grant level and categorical supports. The foundation grant 
was decreased by a nominal $470 per student between 
the 2008–09 school year and the 2011–12 school year. 
Even despite recent growth in state revenues, the current 
foundation grant is less than the grant in the 2008–09 year. 
When adjusted for inflation, the foundation grant’s reduction 
is even greater. Furthermore, a categorical source of funding 
for districts that were being held harmless, section 20(j), was 
vetoed in 2009 and has not been reinstituted. With these 
cuts in per-pupil revenue, districts have had to find expenses 
to cut in order to maintain their fiscal balance.
Not only has the foundation grant been declining, but also 
student enrollment in most districts has been declining. In 
the 2002–03 school year, the state’s enrollment was over 
1.71 million students in K–12. This has declined to 1.52 million 
in 2013–14 (an 11 percent decrease) and is projected to 
decline to just over 1.50 million by 2015–16. If the number 
of districts in Michigan had remained constant, then this 
overall drop in enrollment would have meant that the typical 
district’s enrollment dropped by 11+ percent between 2002 
and 2014. However, the number of districts has not remained 
the same; there has been a dramatic increase in the number 
of districts due mainly to growth in public charter schools. 
So more than three-fourths of the traditional school districts 
that existed in the 2002–03 school year have experienced 
losses in enrollment and almost one-fourth of them have lost 
25 percent or more.
Declining enrollment is a significant 
problem for districts because the 
reduction in expenditures that occurs 
when enrollment drops by a student is far less than 
the foundation grant that is lost. In other words, a loss 
of enrollment typically results in a small decline in costs, 
whereas the revenue associated with any student who leaves 
a district declines by the entire foundation grant. If a small 
number of students leave a district, they will most likely 
come from several different classrooms or schools. Class 
sizes may be slightly smaller, but the district will still have the 
same number of classrooms and schools, and, of course, the 
same number of teachers and building administrators, until 
a sufficient number of students leave to warrant reducing 
classes and teachers. If there are any cost savings, they 
would come from a reduction in materials and possibly 
from less time spent with individual students. Even if the 
enrollment decline does allow a cut in teaching staff, the 
teachers who are laid off will typically be lower paid, which 
reduces the savings to below the district’s average costs. 
The costs of educating a student may also vary substantially 
due to the student mix. Students from poverty backgrounds 
and English language learners (ELL) often times require 
smaller class sizes, mentors, more time on task, or other 
costly interventions in order to succeed. Michigan’s 
categorical for at-risk students (31a) supplements the 
foundation grant, but in the current fiscal year, the level 
of assistance is around $600 per student (free lunch or 
breakfast eligible), which is much less than supplements in 
other states.5 Note that if ELL students are not eligible for at-
risk funding, then these costs must be borne by the district.6 
Another cost differential is the cost of delivering instruction 
by grade level. Best practice for early elementary calls for 
smaller class sizes, which implies more teachers and higher 
costs per student, holding other things equal. Furthermore, 
some subject matters in the secondary grades, such as in 
the arts, sciences (lab courses), or career and technical 
5The executive budget that has been presented to the Michigan legislature increases this categorical by about $180 per eligible student for the next fiscal year. 
However, even with this increase, Michigan’s support for these students pales compared to many other states.




education, may require materials and equipment, which 
make them more expensive on a per student basis. Thus, 
districts with relatively more small-sized elementary 
classrooms or relatively more expensive secondary class 
enrollments will have higher per student costs. 
Other important differentials in cost that vary across 
districts are regional cost/price differentials and the amount 
of transportation provided by districts. In addition to its 
deficiencies with respect to operational costs, the Proposal 
A financing mechanism does not address at all the costs of 
capital improvements and infrastructure costs. 
Traditional districts must use millages 
and thus depend on property values 
for major capital or infrastructure 
improvements. Charter schools 
do not have the opportunity 
to ask voters for millages, 
and so they must use their 
foundation grants or loans. 
Despite these obvious 
differences in the cost of 
providing education across 
districts, Michigan’s current 
funding mechanism does not 
take them into account when 
allocating revenue. The system’s 
funding completely neglects some 
important cost differentials (such as 
declining enrollment, grade level differences, or 
regional cost differences) and barely addresses other cost 
differentials (such as economically disadvantaged students, 
English language learners, subject matter differences, 
or varied transportation requirements). In this study, we 
note that many other states, particularly leading states 
with better trends in achievement, do much more than 
Michigan to address such cost differentials. We recommend 
that Michigan take steps to begin to address these cost 
differentials as well.
Learners from Low-Income Families: 
Michigan Needs to Do Better
Attention to learners from low-income families is not just 
a matter of cost differentials. Students from low-income 
families, a disproportionate share of whom come from 
disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups, should have equal 
educational opportunities to other students. This becomes 
problematic upon consideration of the finding in our study 
that low-income students are essentially in double jeopardy. 
As is commonly known, there is a persistent achievement 
gap between economically disadvantaged students (for 
which free or reduced price lunch eligibility serves 
as a proxy) and students who are not 
economically disadvantaged, but this 
gap is typically measured as a 
difference in means. Our analyses 
show that there is an interaction 
(or feedback loop) between 
being an economically 
disadvantaged student 
and the percentage of 
students in a district who are 
economically disadvantaged. 
In other words, the gap in test 
scores between low-income 
students and non-low-income 
students is much larger for 
districts with a high percentage of 
low-income students than for districts 
with a low percentage of low-income 
students. 
What can or should be done for students from low-income 
households? We have identified several exemplary states 
based on growth in achievement scores for low-income and 
non-low-income students. All but one of these states invests 
at least $1,000 more than Michigan in state funding per low-
income student. For this and other reasons, we recommend 
restricting a substantial share of the SEED grant initiative to 
districts with at least 50 percent free or reduced price lunch 
enrollment and increasing substantially the funding that goes 
Our analyses show 
that there is an interaction 
between being an economically 
disadvantaged student and 
the percentage of students in a 
district who are 
economically 
disadvantaged.  
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to at-risk students. Furthermore, the at-risk funding needs to 
be progressive. This can be accomplished by weighting the 
funding by the share of low-income students.
The Study and Its Recommendations
Student achievement depends on a host of factors including 
student characteristics, curriculum and instruction, time on 
task, teacher quality, and parental and community support. 
Our study focuses on the financing of K-12 education in 
the state. To a large extent, finances determine the quality 
and quantity of instruction provided to the state’s most 
precious resource: its children.  After a brief introductory 
chapter, the second chapter of this report explains how 
Proposal A radically altered the funding of K–12 education in 
Michigan’s school districts, reviews studies of the influence 
of that funding change on student achievement — including 
supplementary analyses by our research team — and points 
out the unintended consequences of Proposal A. The fact 
that the state imposed a substantial change in its funding 
mechanism in a relatively short span of time prompted a 
number of studies, as researchers felt that the exogeneity 
of the change could be used to identify the causal effect of 
funding on achievement. Whereas the implementation of 
Proposal A gave researchers an opportunity to identify the 
impact of money on student achievement, it has also, over 
the years, been shown to have shortcomings that should be 
resolved. 
Following the background chapter on Proposal A, the next 
chapter of this report examines student achievement in 
Michigan and other states. The cross-state comparisons use 
NAEP data, which is the only source of information that can 
be used for this sort of comparative analysis. In addition, we 
use MEAP data to examine student achievement results in 
Michigan that extend beyond previous studies. The chapter 
also addresses the methodology and data that we used to 
select seven exemplary states that may hold useful lessons 
for Michiganders.
The fourth chapter delves into education financing. It 
provides detail about the mechanisms used in other states, 
with particular emphases on the 
seven states identified as exemplary 
in student achievement. The chapter also 
examines how and why recent reforms have been 
undertaken. Finally, it reviews studies that have shown 
how these and other school finance reforms have affected 
student achievement and other outcomes. 
The final chapter of the report focuses on recommendations 
based on our analyses and review of existing evidence. 
Among these recommendations are the following:
n The state should implement a four-year competitive 
grant program for districts (traditional and charter 
schools) to offer services/interventions that have 
been shown to be more effective at increasing 
student achievement than simply expanding 
resources. The districts that receive grants will be 
required to evaluate the efficacy of their service/
intervention. A funding level of $200 million for this 
Smart Expenditure Educational Demonstration 
(SEED) initiative will serve 200,000 Michigan 
students. Two-thirds of the funding should be 
reserved for districts with over 50 percent of 
students eligible for free or reduced price meals. 
(Estimated annual state funding level: $200 
million.)
n Proposal A should be altered to allow local districts 
to request from taxpayers enhancement millages of 
up to 3.0 mills per year for a maximum of five years. 
These enhancement millages would be used only 
for operating (and not capital) expenses. The state 
should supplement the millages that are approved 
in districts that are relatively poor in property value. 
(Estimated annual state funding level: $150 million.)
n The state should ensure that its legislatively 
mandated adequacy study be rigorous, using 
an econometric analysis of cost data as well as 
qualitative data from experts concerning what 
constitutes best practice in instruction for all 




non-instructional activities. These qualitative data 
need to be converted to costs in a fully documented 
manner. (Estimated total state funding level: $1 
million [already in budget].)
 The state should increase its funding level and 
institute a progressive funding structure for fund aid 
for at-risk students (the section 31a categorical). 
Michigan’s current extra funding for low-income 
students is very low compared to the practices 
of states that are outpacing it in educational 
achievement gains, and our funding practices need 
to change, both to increase overall achievement 
and to provide for greater equity in opportunities. 
In addition to increasing the at-risk funding level for 
the state as a whole, we propose adding a premium 
to the per-student allocation of at-risk funds of 0.50 
times the percentage of students who are eligible 
for free or reduced price lunch.  A district with 
100 percent low-income students would receive 
1.5 times the at-risk funding per pupil as a district 
with no low-income students. (Estimated annual 
increase in state funding level: $200 million.)
 For districts that have declines in enrollment of 
more than 2 percent in a year, state aid should 
include a declining enrollment adjustment that 
equals one-half of the foundation grant times the 
net enrollment loss. (Estimated annual state funding 
level: $20 million.)
 Michigan should alter Proposal A to provide 
adjustments to the per-student foundation grant 
that weights more heavily enrollments in grades 
1–3 and grades 9–12, where costs are higher. 
Furthermore, increasing the level of funding for 
grades 9–12 will be an incentive to districts to reduce 
their high school dropout rates. (Estimated increase 
in state funding level: $0.)
We note that we did not attempt to address the funding of 




As we conducted our analyses, it became apparent that 
Michigan’s lagging economy has been detrimental to 
the state’s educational achievement and limits severely 
the state’s ability to improve its K–12 system. The 
recommendations we off er are only the fi rst steps on the road 
toward excellence.
We believe that successfully traversing that road will require 
a unifi ed commitment to excellence by all policymakers, 
education practitioners, and citizens. The means will 
come from accelerated economic growth over the long 
run. Ironically, it will require substantial investments in an 
improved education system to achieve that growth.
Our intent is for the ideas and recommendations presented 
in this report to spark debate and dialogue among policy 
makers, the public, the media, and other stakeholders about 
how K–12 funding is raised, how it is allocated, how it is spent, 
and how it contributes to academic achievement in our state. 
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Michigan is a state in which education has been accorded high priority by policymakers, parents, businesses, educational watchdog organizations, the media, and others; yet 
student achievement has been stagnant over the last decade. 
Test score measures of student achievement have been flat, 
and the gaps between economically disadvantaged students 
and other students have widened as compared to other 
states. In relative rankings, Michigan has slipped considerably 
from the middle to the bottom quintile of states. The slippage 
is not a matter of declining levels of achievement in Michigan. 
Rather, it is a matter of increasing achievement in other 
states, while achievement in this state has stalled.
Michigan’s standing vis-à-vis other states is not just a matter 
of state pride. Michigan’s disadvantages relative to the 
nation are sufficient to predict future earnings for Michigan 
students that are about 2 percent below what they would 
be if Michigan’s test scores matched the national average. 
Two percent may sound minor, but a 2 percent disadvantage 
added up over a career is a significant amount of money. 
On average, the present discounted value of a worker’s 
earnings over her career exceeds $900,000, so 2 percent 
extra earnings would have a present value of over $18,000.7 
Applying an $18,000 career earnings boost to each of the 
approximately 1.5 million K–12 students in Michigan results 
in a potentially huge total state benefit: over $27 billion in 
the present value of extra career earnings for this group 
of students. Thus there is a large economic stake to even 
small improvements in average academic achievement for 
Michigan’s students.
It is, of course, the case that student achievement depends 
on a host of factors such as student characteristics, 
curriculum and instruction, time on task, teacher quality, 
and parental and community support. Our study focuses 
on the financing of K-12 education in Michigan. Just over 20 
years ago, Michigan altered significantly its K–12 funding 
mechanism with the passage of Proposal A. This change 
has greatly influenced the level and distribution of funding 
available to school districts over the years since its passage. 
Proposal A addressed funding inequities across districts, 
which were one motivation for its passage. However, it has 
had some unintended consequences that suggest that it may 
be time to consider modifying or replacing it.
The purpose of this study is to take a hard look at Proposal A 
and trends in student achievement and education financing 
in Michigan relative to other states. It considers whether the 
funding mechanism in Michigan may be disadvantageous for 
some students and makes recommendations as to how that 
funding mechanism can be improved. 
The next chapter of this report explains how Proposal A 
radically altered the funding of K–12 education in Michigan’s 
school districts, reviews studies of the influence of that 
funding change on student achievement, documents 
statistical analyses undertaken by our research team 
concerning the effect of resources on student achievement, 
and points out the unintended consequences that were 
alluded to above. The state’s imposition of such a substantial 
and rapid change in its funding mechanism prompted 
several studies as researchers felt that the “exogeneity” 
of the change could be used to identify the causal effect 
of resources on achievement. That is, Proposal A was a 
“natural experiment,” wherein some districts’ educational 
spending was increased significantly relative to other 
districts because of a sudden state policy change. Whereas 
7This average considers both workers whose career paths would be unaffected by changes in test scores and workers whose career paths (and earnings) would 
be substantially altered by change in these scores. These calculations rely on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test scores for 2012, the 
relationship between test scores and lifetime earnings in Chetty et al. (2011), earnings of all individuals aged 16–80 in the 2012 American Community Survey 




the implementation of Proposal A gave researchers an 
opportunity to identify the impact of money on student 
achievement, it has also, over the years, been shown to have 
shortcomings that should be resolved. 
Following the background chapter on Proposal A, the next 
chapter of this report examines student achievement in 
Michigan and in other states. The cross-state comparisons 
use data from the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP), which is the only source of information that 
can be used for this sort of comparative analyses. In addition, 
we use Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) 
data to examine student achievement results in the state. 
Since the purpose of the study is to suggest ways that the 
funding mechanism in Michigan might be changed in order 
to improve student outcomes, it is appropriate to examine 
comparable data across states to identify those that are 
successful. Using criteria that look at test score levels, trends 
over time, and gaps between economically disadvantaged 
students and non-economically-disadvantaged students, we 
have selected seven exemplary, successful states that may 
hold useful lessons for Michiganders.
The fourth chapter delves into education financing. It 
provides some detail about the mechanisms used in other 
states with particular emphases on the exemplary states. An 
important part of the chapter is its consideration of the fiscal 
capacity of Michigan to provide additional resources. Finally, 
it also reviews studies that have shown how school finance 
reforms have affected student achievement and other 
outcomes. 
The final chapter of the report focuses on recommendations 
based on our analyses and review of existing evidence. The 
details of and rationales for these recommendations are 
presented in the last chapter. Our intent is for the ideas and 
recommendations presented in this report to spark debate 
and dialogue among policymakers, the public, the media, 
and other stakeholders about how K–12 funding is raised, 
allocated, and spent, and how it contributes to academic 
achievement in the state.
Col-
The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan
3
II: School Financing in Michigan
Alittle over two decades ago, Michigan made a dramatic change in the way that it funded its K–12 educational system. This chapter reviews the history of the change and discusses studies of the 
effects of that change on student achievement. The change 
from a system that relied on local funding to one that used 
state-funded foundation grants has had positive impacts 
on student achievement, according to published studies. 
Upjohn Institute staff members replicated these studies with 
a longer panel of data, and found results consistent with 
the earlier studies. Nevertheless, Proposal A seems to have 
resulted in fiscal instability in districts experiencing significant 
enrollment changes. The general trend in enrollments 
is downward over the past decade, as the state has lost 
population. In addition, the financial instability of districts has 
been exacerbated by the trends in charter school enrollments 
and interdistrict choice programs. Thus, it may be time to 
alter the funding mechanism of Proposal A. 
A. Proposal A
In March 1993, the Kalkaska School District closed its 
doors to students because local voters had voted down 
an operating millage for the schools for the third time, and 
the district’s school board decided that closing the schools 
altogether was its best option. Students were denied almost 
three months of education. At commencement on March 
28th (instead of the planned end of school in early June), the 
senior class president said that he hoped that Kalkaska’s 
difficulty would lead to a change in school funding in 
Michigan. While school funding inequity may not have been 
the primary reason for the change in school funding, the class 
president’s wish came true with the passage of Proposal A in 
March of the following year. 
Prior to the 1994–95 school year, Michigan districts were 
funded by local property taxes that were partially equalized 
by the state. In the 1993–94 school year, for example, the 
state guaranteed districts $102.50 per mill plus fixed-
dollar payments per pupil of $400.8 In a district whose 
property values were quite low, say a state equalized value 
(SEV)9 of $80,000 per pupil, a tax rate of 30 mills would 
generate $2,400 in local revenue (0.030 × $80,000). Since 
the state guaranteed minimum for that district would be 
$3,475 ($102.50 × 0.030 + $400), state aid per pupil would 
be $1,075 (the difference between the state guaranteed 
minimum and local revenue). If a district had much higher 
property values, say an SEV of $400,000 per student, and a 
30 mill tax rate for schools, then its local revenue per student 
would be $12,000. Because the local revenue per pupil 
exceeded the state guarantee, such a district would be “out 
of formula” and it would receive no state aid. 
The problems with this funding formula were that it was 
inequitable and that state support could fluctuate within the 
budget year. The inequity can be seen in the two districts 
described above that have the same tax rate but different 
per-pupil revenue, even after state support, of more than 
$8,500 ($12,000 − $3,475). The instability in the state 
support occurred because the state guaranteed minimum 
was based on budget and enrollment estimates, but the 
actual levels paid out depended on realized enrollments, local 
millage rates, and SEVs that could change during the year. If 
such changes led to total state aid exceeding the budgeted 
amount, state aid would be adjusted downward in order for 
the budget to balance, disproportionately cutting payments 
to poorer districts. 
Under this system, the state provided 37 percent of the 
combined local and state funding for K–12 education in 
8The $400 was composed of a flat grant of $326 per pupil, plus $74 in incentive payments.




Table 2-1. Proposal A Parameters and Gap between Michigan’s Maximum 
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NOTE: The 1993–94 fiscal year is pre-Proposal A. The district maximum column is the state revenue for Bloomfield Hills, which is the highest 
per-pupil-funded district with at least 10 enrolled students. At various times, fixed per-pupil equity payments were built into the basic level: a $200 
payment was instituted in FY 2001–02, a $23 payment was added in FY 2006–07, and a $125 payment was added in FY 2014–15. There have also 
occasionally been mid-year cuts during budgetary shortfalls: in FY 2002–03 and FY 2003–04, state aid payments were cut by $74 per pupil in all 
districts without any alteration to the statutory minimum or threshold; and in FY 2009–10 and FY 2010–11, there were analogous reductions in state 
aid of $154 and $170, respectively. All entries are in nominal dollars.
  
 aDuring the first five years of Proposal A implementation, the state had separate “effective minimum” and “effective basic” levels of funding. These 
figures are the former and are the amounts actually used. The “effective basic” started at a value of $5,000 in 1994–95, which was felt to be the 
desirable minimum support, but presumably would have required an infeasible level of state support. The two concepts were unified starting with SFY 
1999.
bSection 20j categorical veto is built into this figure.
SOURCE: Senate Fiscal Agency, 2014a. 
Michigan. In the 1994–95 school year, with Proposal A, the 
state funding mechanism drastically changed to a foundation 
grant system. With the enactment of Proposal A, the state’s 
share of combined state and local funding rose dramatically 
to 80 percent. Under the foundation grant system, the state 
effectively sets two levels of operational funding per pupil: a 
guaranteed minimum, called the effective basic foundation 
grant, and a maximum level of support, called the hold 
harmless threshold (or basic)10 level. 
The foundation allowance for a district may be at the 
guaranteed minimum (where most districts are), may be 
between the minimum and the hold harmless threshold 
level, or may be greater than the threshold. From year to 
year, districts at the minimum level all receive the same 
increase (or decrease), which is the change in the guaranteed 
minimum set by the state. Districts with funding that is 
greater than the basic (threshold) level all receive the same 
increase (or decrease), which is the change in the threshold 
level (this change is always less than or equal to the change 
in the minimum). Districts in between the two levels receive 
a pro-rated change level that is between the change in the 
minimum and the threshold. The intent of Proposal A is to 
reduce the disparity in the levels of funding per pupil across 
districts by increasing the basic foundation grant faster than 
the maximum support level, so that eventually all districts 
would be equalized or close to equalized, and there would be 
no local hold harmless millages.
 
State funding comes from a variety of revenue sources, but 
mainly from a substantial portion of the state sales tax, a 
portion of the state income tax, the real estate transfer tax, 
and a 6.0 mill education property tax. Local funding mainly 
comes from two sources. Districts may levy up to 18.0 
mills (over and above the 6.0 state millage rate) on non-
homestead property with voter approval; and if districts have 
had historically high levels of revenue per pupil, they may levy 
a hold harmless millage on homestead and non-homestead 
property, again with voter approval. Local funding may also 
be raised through an enhancement 
millage of up to 3.0 mills that must 
be approved by voters in the district’s 
intermediate school district. 
Table 2-1 on the previous page shows the statutory changes 
in the effective basic, hold harmless threshold, and maximum 
district levels of funding in the year prior to the passage of 
Proposal A and over the years since it was implemented. The 
final column in the table shows the maximum funding gap in 
the state. Note that the change in the threshold, or maximum 
support, level is always equal to or less than the change in 
the effective basic grant, or minimum support level. The 
funding gap that is displayed in the final column of the table, 
which is a measure of the improvement in equity among 
districts, steadily decreases from over $7,500 in the year 
immediately before Proposal A to $4,733 in the current fiscal 
year. After an immediate decrease in this gap of $1,278 in the 
year that Proposal A was implemented, the gap has gradually 
narrowed by another $1,521, or about 25 percent, over the 
intervening 21 years.
Table 2-2 on Page 6 adjusts the funding levels displayed in 
Table 2-1 for inflation. The entries in that table show that 
districts that just receive the basic foundation grant have 
in recent years received per-pupil funding that is almost 
precisely the same, in inflation-adjusted dollars, as the 
funding in 1996–97. However in the intervening years, the 
effective basic funding in real dollars increased by over 
20 percent before falling back to its earlier level. Districts 
whose funding levels were at or near the state’s maximum 
foundation grant (at the hold harmless threshold level) have 
seen the state per-pupil support fall by approximately 20 
percent in real terms over the past 20 years. In real terms, 
the gap between the maximum and minimum district per-
pupil funding has decreased significantly. It dropped by 19.1 
percent in the first year that Proposal A was implemented, 
and then it fell by about 52 percent over the succeeding 21 
years.
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10 The word “basic” is used to mean two different concepts. The minimum foundation grant is referred to as the Effective Basic grant (see Senate Fiscal Agency 




Table 2-2. Proposal A Parameters and Gap between Michigan’s Maximum 
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NOTE: Table entries are from Table 2-1 converted to 2014-15 dollars, using CPI-U.
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B. Impact of Proposal A on Student 
Achievement
Proposal A was not promulgated as a school improvement 
initiative, per se. It did not have any regulations, incentives, 
or sanctions directed at teaching and learning. It was mainly 
intended to provide property tax relief and improved per-
pupil funding equity. Of course, in accomplishing the latter, 
it produced relative “gainers” and “losers,” as some districts 
gained greater increases in state support than others. To the 
extent that student achievement depends on funding levels, 
we would expect that Proposal A would disproportionately 
benefit student achievement in “gainer” districts.
Papke (2005) carried out the first analysis that used Proposal 
A to estimate the effect of spending changes on student 
achievement, and therefore to indirectly identify the effects of 
Proposal A on student achievement. Using school-level data 
from the MEAP for 4th grade mathematics over the seven-
year period from 1991–92 to 1997–98, Papke estimated the 
impact of spending on passing the test — scoring above the 
cut score, i.e., receiving a satisfactory. Her results suggest 
that for each $1,000 increase in per-pupil spending, the 
4th grade math passing rate increased by between  2.2 and 
3.7 percentage points. When she looked at schools in lower 
spending districts that received relatively more funding 
after the implementation of Proposal A, the increase was 
between 3.2 and 10.3 percentage points. In contrast, schools 
in historically higher spending districts experienced passing 
rates that rose between 1.3 and 2.6 percentage points. Over 
the period, the MEAP passing rates went up for all schools, 
on average, but the lower spending districts’ schools were the 
relative “gainers.”
In a subsequent paper, Papke (2008) uses a longer panel of 
data, both pre- and post-Proposal A, to attempt to replicate 
her earlier results. Even though the per-pupil funding 
equalization slowed in the early 2000s, the author finds it 
was still the case that the impact of higher levels of resources 
was more than three times as great for lower-spending 
districts as for higher-spending districts.
Roy (2011) also examines the impact 
of Proposal A on academic achievement. 
He focuses on two aspects of Proposal A: the 
relative increase in per-pupil revenue in lower-spending 
districts and the loss of significant local control over revenue 
(and thus spending) of all districts because of the imposition 
of state decision making. Similar to Papke, he hypothesized 
that districts with larger increases in revenue as a result 
of Proposal A would exhibit gains in student achievement 
relative to initially higher-spending districts. But in 
addition, he hypothesized that the lack of local discretion in 
spending increases would have a negative effect on student 
performance in higher-spending districts. 
Using 4th grade MEAP data from 1990 through 2001 for 
reading and mathematics, Roy (2011) employs a cohort 
analysis to empirically confirm that passing rates in the 
lowest-spending districts increased faster than those in 
higher-spending districts. Applying an instrumental variable 
approach to establish causality, he finds an increase in 
the passing rate on the reading test of between 3 and 
6 percentage points for every $1,000 in additional per-
pupil revenue. This translates to an effect size of between 
0.20 and 0.40 standard deviations. For mathematics, the 
results are slightly stronger: an increase of between 6 and 8 
percentage points for every $1,000 in additional per-pupil 
revenue, or an effect size of between 0.40 and 0.55 standard 
deviations. These results suggest that during the years 
1994–95 through 1998–99, the districts that received the 
basic foundation grant — which increased by $970 over the 
period — had increases in 4th grade MEAP passing rates 
of between 3 and 6 points for reading and between 6 and 8 
points for math. Districts during those years that received 
the state maximum grant — which increased by only $462 — 
had increases of half the magnitude, leading to a narrowing 
of the achievement gap across districts.11
Roy is much more circumspect about his second hypothesis. 
In this case, he suggests that the deterioration in MEAP 
results of districts in the highest quintile of spending relative 
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11 However, he found no statistically significant impact of changes in per-pupil spending on ACT-taking rates or ACT scores.
W.E.UPJOHN INSTITUTE
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to all other districts may result from less control over revenue 
in the years after the implementation of Proposal A.
C. Further Analyses of Proposal A
The studies that look at the impact of Proposal A on student 
achievement suggest that resources matter. The districts 
that received the largest increases in funding had the largest 
increases in student achievement. From a social science 
perspective, Proposal A can be viewed as a good “natural 
experiment” to see what happens when a state makes 
large and variable changes in real revenue per pupil across 
different school districts. The reform effectively increased 
revenue per pupil in many school districts, particularly lower-
income rural school districts, and these districts showed 
greater improvements in academic performance. 
8
We have replicated and extended the analyses of Papke 
(2005, 2008) and Roy (2011). Figure 2-1 shows the estimated 
relationship among Michigan school districts between the 
20-year change in real state and local revenue per pupil 
from 1993 (just before Proposal A) to 2013 and the change 
in the passing rate on the MEAP test. The regression line 
shown in the figure indicates a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the two changes. In particular, 
the slope of the line suggests that a district’s passing rate 
on the MEAP increases about 1.5 percentage points when 
its (inflation-adjusted) per-pupil revenue rises by $1,000. 
(Adding additional control variables to the regression reduces 
the slope to about 1.2 percentage points, but it remains 
statistically significant.)
Figure 2-1. Change in Average MEAP Passing Rate Between 1993 and 2013, 
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Change in Revenue
Fitted values Change in MEAP
NOTE: Each point is a Michigan 
school district. The horizontal 
axis shows the change in real 
state and local general funding 
per pupil between 1993, just 
before Proposal A, and 2013. 
The vertical axis shows the 
change in the average MEAP 
passage rate over all the 
reading and math MEAP tests 
given in that district. Without 
controls, the regression line has 
an estimated coefficient of 1.46 
(t-statistic of 4.44) per $1,000 
dollar change in per-pupil 
funding. Controlling for the 
change in the share of students 
in a district who are low 
income lowers the coefficient 
slightly to 1.33 (t-stat = 4.29). 
Additionally controlling for the 
initial period’s funding level and 
MEAP pass rate further lowers 
the coefficient to 1.16 (t-stat = 
2.95).
SOURCE: Michigan Educational 
Assessment Program (MEAP).
The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan
9
Later in this document, we use these results to extrapolate 
the amount of additional resources that it would take to 
upgrade Michigan’s student achievement to the level of 
the U.S. average and to the level of exemplary states, as 
well as the resources it would take to reduce gaps between 
disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students. These 
extrapolations assume that the status quo delivery of 
teaching and learning (i.e., classroom productivity) is 
unchanged. An emphasis of our study is that more resources 
are needed and that any additional resources invested in the 
system should be used on interventions or strategies that 
have been shown to be effective.
D. If Student Achievement Generally Rose with 
Proposal A, What’s Not to Love?
School districts (charter and traditional) are private nonprofit 
or public entities. As such, they are not intended to make 
a profit, nor can they sustain large or long-lasting losses. It 
is important, then, that changes in costs from year to year 
(i.e., marginal costs) get approximately balanced by changes 
in revenue (marginal revenue). A single foundation grant 
system, such as that imposed by Proposal A, is inflexible by 
design. The inflexibility of the Proposal A mechanism tends 
to hurt very rapidly growing school districts (traditional 
or charter) and districts that are experiencing declining 
enrollment. In the former case, the per-student cost of 
expansion is likely to exceed the foundation grant. In the 
latter case, the cost reduction is likely to be less than the 
reduction in revenue. 
Unfortunately, several events have stressed the financial 
status of many districts: state fiscal distress that caused 
a rollback in the foundation grant level and categorical 
supports, declining student enrollment in the state, and an 
increased number of districts. As noted in Table 2-1, after 
fairly steady growth in the foundation grant between 1994 
and 2008 (with the exception of two temporary cuts in the 
early 2000s), the foundation grant was reduced by $470 
per student between the 2008–09 school year and the 
2011–12 school year. Despite growing state revenues, the 
current foundation grant in nominal terms is less than it was 
in the 2008–09 year. Furthermore, 
a categorical source of funding for 
districts that were being held harmless, 
section 20(j), was vetoed in 2009 and has not been 
reinstituted. With these cuts in per-pupil revenue, districts 
have had to cut expenses in order to maintain their fiscal 
balance.
If we adjust for inflation, the recent financial trends for 
Michigan schools are much more unfavorable. For example, 
in Table 2-1, from the 2008–09 school year to the 2014–15 
school year, the effective basic minimum foundation grant 
declined in nominal terms, without adjusting for inflation, 
from $7,316 per student in 2008-09 to $7,251 per student 
in 2014-15. In nominal terms, this is a decline of only 0.9 
percent. If we adjust for increasing prices, Table 2-2 shows 
that the $7,316 per student in 2008–09 would be equivalent 
to $8,168 in 2014-15 dollars. The actual $7,251 per student 
in 2014–15 then represents an 11.2 percent decline in real 
resources per student. Inflation in costs is a reality that 
districts have to deal with — costs of buying inputs such 
as fuel for buses or textbooks or other supplies go up with 
inflation, and schools face pressures for wages to keep pace 
with inflation in order to stay competitive in the labor market. 
Unfortunately, Kalkaska-like situations are arising again 
in Michigan, as two districts closed their doors due to 
insolvency in 2013, and more than 50 others are close to 
bankruptcy (Michigan Department of Education 2014). 
Clearly, Proposal A has not prevented fiscal distress in 
Michigan’s school districts. The problem is mainly the 
vicious circle created by declining enrollment. This vicious 
circle comprises the cycle of enrollment losses causing 
revenue losses, which necessitate program cuts that impair 
educational quality, that precipitate further enrollment 
losses.
The primary source of revenue for districts is state and 
local aid that is essentially composed of the foundation 
grant multiplied by student enrollment. Not only has the 




student enrollment has also been declining. In the 2002–03 
school year, the state’s K–12 enrollment was over 1.71 million 
students. It declined to 1.52 million in 2013–14 (an 11 percent 
decrease), and it is projected to decline to 1.50 million by 
2015–16. If the number of districts in Michigan had remained 
constant, then this overall drop in enrollment would have 
meant that the typical district’s enrollment dropped by about 
11 percent between 2002 and 2014. However, mainly because 
of the growth in public charter schools, the effective number 
of districts has increased considerably, raising the costs of 
overhead and administration. More than three-fourths of 
the traditional school districts that existed in the 
2002–03 school year have experienced 
losses in enrollment; almost one-fourth 
of them have shrunk by at least 25 
percent.
As cogently presented in 
Citizens Research Council 
(CRC) (2015), declining 
enrollment is a significant 
problem for districts 
because the foundation 
grant that is lost exceeds the 
marginal cost of educating 
one student. In other words, 
a loss of enrollment typically 
decreases costs only slightly, 
whereas the forfeited foundation grant 
revenue from losing a student is relatively 
substantial. If a few students leave a district, 
they will most likely come from several different classroom or 
schools. Class sizes may be slightly smaller, but the district 
is likely to have the same number of classrooms and schools, 
and, of course, the same number of teachers and building 
administrators. If there are any cost savings, they would 
come from a reduction in materials and possibly from less 
time spent with individual students. In short, the costs in 
producing K–12 education are “lumpy.”
Average expenditures per student may also vary 
substantially because of the mix of students in the district. 
Students from poverty backgrounds often require smaller 
class sizes, mentors, more time on task, or other costly 
interventions in order to succeed. Michigan authorizes 
additional spending to supplement the foundation grant for 
at-risk students under section 31a of the State School Aid 
Act.12 However, in the current fiscal year, the level 
of assistance is around $600 per eligible 
student, much less than supplements 
in other states. (The executive 
budget that has been presented 
to the Michigan legislature 
increases this categorical 
by about $180 per eligible 
student for the next fiscal 
year.) English language 
learners also require costly 
interventions relative to 
other students in order to 
succeed. If these students are 
not eligible for at-risk funding, 
then these costs must be borne 
by the district. 
Another differential is the cost of delivering 
instruction by grade level. Best practice for 
early elementary grades calls for smaller class sizes, which 
imply more teachers and thus higher costs per student, 
holding other things equal. Furthermore, some subjects in 
the secondary grades — for instance, arts, sciences (lab 
courses), or career and technical education — may require 
12“At-risk” students, according to Michigan, are students who have low achievement on state or local assessments in core subject areas; do not meet proficiency 
standards in reading by the end of 3rd grade; do not meet career or college readiness at the end of 12th grade; are victims of child abuse or neglect; are pregnant 
teenagers or teenage parents; have a family history of school failure, incarceration or substance abuse; are pupils in a priority or priority successor school; or at 
least two out of the following seven criteria: 1) eligible for free breakfast, lunch, or milk; 2) excessively absent; 3) homeless; 4) migrant; 5) English language learner; 
6) immigrant within last three years; or 7) did not complete high school in four years.
More than three-
fourths of the traditional 
school districts that existed in 
the 2002–03 school year have 
experienced losses in enrollment; 
almost one-fourth of them 
have shrunk by at least 
25 percent.
College Costs: Students
Can’t Afford Not to Know
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materials and equipment, which make them more expensive 
on a per-student basis. Thus, districts with disproportionately 
greater enrollment in early elementary grades or in high 
school grades will have higher per-student costs. 
Other important differentials in cost that vary across districts 
are regional cost/price differentials and the amount of 
transportation provided by districts. Edgar Olsen, of the 
University of Virginia, has constructed a data series that 
provides cost of living estimates for urban areas in the 
U.S.13 To give a sense of the variation in Michigan, we use 
the estimates from Olsen’s website14 for Ann Arbor, Benton 
Harbor, Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, and Kalamazoo. Using 
Kalamazoo as a baseline with an index of 100, the 2012 CPI 
estimates for Ann Arbor, Benton Harbor, Detroit, Flint, and 
Grand Rapids would be 108.1, 99.5, 102.9, 97.4, and 105.8, 
respectively. Just using these data for cities, we find a cost of 
living differential of 11 percent between Flint and Ann Arbor —
two cities that are relatively close to each other.15
Districts also vary considerably by geographic size, and 
consequently by transportation costs. Most charter school 
districts and some urban districts spend nothing on 
transportation. Many rural or small-city districts spend up to 
5 percent of their budget on transportation. Thus, on average, 
the latter districts are spending 
around $350 of their foundation grants 
on transportation, whereas some other 
districts are spending $0. 
In short, Michigan’s financing mechanism poorly addresses 
well-known and well-recognized cost differentials: at-
risk students, declining enrollments, instructional cost 
differences by grade level, regional cost/price variation, and 
transportation needs.
In addition to its deficiencies with respect to operational 
costs, the Proposal A financing mechanism does not address 
at all the costs of capital improvements and infrastructure 
costs. Traditional districts must use millages and thus 
depend on property values for major capital or infrastructure 
improvements. Charter schools do not have the opportunity 
to ask voters for millages, and so they must use their 
foundation grants or loans. 
Finally, Michigan has always prided itself on its adherence 
to local control, but Proposal A does not allow localities to 
exercise their preference for educational quality, except for 
rarely passed intermediate school district supplements.
 
 
13  Olsen’s series are considered quite reliable and have been used in a number of academic publications that have undergone peer review. See, for example, Olsen 
(2012) and Olsen and Early (2012). 
14 http://eoolsen.weebly.com/price-indices.html, accessed 05/12/2015.
15 Note that we do not recommend adjusting the foundation grant for regional cost differentials in this study. We are concerned about the extent to which housing 
cost differentials “drive” the regional cost of living differentials. Housing costs are likely to be low in disadvantaged communities such as Benton Harbor or Detroit, 
which arguably may need higher foundation grants, and are likely to be high in wealthier communities such as Ann Arbor. Furthermore, communities with high 




This chapter examines student achievement as a prelude for a detailed examination of finances in the ensuing chapter. If there were no concerns about Michigan’s student achievement, there 
would be little need to consider altering the finance 
mechanism at all. However, as this chapter demonstrates, 
apprehension about student achievement in Michigan is well 
placed. 
The first section of the chapter examines trends in student 
academic achievement in Michigan relative to the national 
average. Using National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) data, which are available for all states, and statistics 
on high school graduation and dropout rates, the picture 
drawn of Michigan is one of decline relative to the nation 
as a whole. The next section of the chapter turns to an 
analysis of achievement by Michigan’s vulnerable students, 
identified in this study as qualifying for the federal school 
lunch program.16 In this section, we analyze the student 
achievement of low-income and non-low-income students in 
Michigan and in all other states. We identify seven exemplary 
states that we use as “benchmarks” for Michigan. The last 
section of the chapter identifies the detrimental effects on 
student achievement for both low-income and non-low-
income students of attending schools in districts with high 
percentages of students eligible for the free lunch program. 
A. Michigan’s Academic Performance 
over Time
NAEP, also known as the nation’s report card, is the 
only nationally representative assessment of student 
The Road to K-12
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16 The National School Lunch Program is a federally assisted meal program operating in public and nonprofit private schools and residential child care institutions. 
It provides nutritionally balanced, low-cost, or free lunches to children each school day. The program was established under the National School Lunch Act, signed 
by President Harry Truman in 1946. Students whose families earn less than 130 percent of the federal poverty level are eligible for free lunches, and those from 
families with incomes greater than 130 percent and less than 185 percent qualify for reduced price lunches. The current federal poverty guidelines place a family 
of four earning $31,525 at 130 percent of the poverty level and a family of four earning $44,823 at 185 percent of the poverty level. For those in Alaska and Hawaii, 
the income levels are slightly higher.
III: Student Achievement in Michigan
achievement that can be used to compare states. NAEP 
assesses 4th, 8th, and 12th graders in different subjects at 
different frequencies. Assessments of mathematics and 
reading are given most often, generally biennially.
Figure 3-1 shows the trend over the past two decades in 
NAEP math score results for Michigan and for the U.S. as a 
whole for 4th and 8th graders. The figure shows the mean 
scale score results for both grades on a common scale. 
Before 2000, the average test scores for both grades in 
Michigan exceed that of the U.S. average. After 2000, the 
pattern reverses — the U.S. average scores exceed the 
Michigan average scores, and the differences slowly increase.
Figure 3-2 shows the NAEP results for reading. In this case, 
the 8th grade reading results are available for Michigan only 
since 2002. With the exception of the 2013 4th grade means, 
the averages for the U.S. and for Michigan are much closer 
to each other than the math assessment means. However, 
it is worth noting that again the U.S. means are greater than 
or equal to the Michigan means continuously for years since 
2005.
Besides test scores, two other metrics related to student 
achievement are the high school completion rate and the 
high school dropout rate. Measures of these rates can be 
found in the Common Core Data system of the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The event dropout 
rate is defined as the percentage of high school students 
who left high school between the beginning of one school 











Figure 3-1. Michigan and U.S. Math Scores on NAEP, by Year













































◆ MI 4th grade math NAEP score US 4th grade math NAEP score
MI 8th grade math NAEP score US 8th grade math NAEP score
SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress.
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school diploma or an alternative credential such as a GED.17 
The average freshman graduation rate in an academic year 
is calculated as the number of high school diplomas awarded 
during that year divided by the arithmetic average of the 8th, 
9th, and 10th grade enrollments in four, three, and two years 
prior to the academic year, respectively. 
Table 3-1 shows the event dropout rate and the average 
freshman graduation rate for public high school students 
in both Michigan and the U.S. For 7 of the 10 years shown in 
Table 3-1, the event dropout rates are higher for Michigan 
than for the national average, and the graduation rates for 
Michigan are lower than the national average. The average 
freshman graduation rates for Michigan are close to the 
U.S. average over this time period, but they have lagged 
considerably more since the advent of the Great Recession. 
Michigan’s graduation rates are slightly higher during the 
last three years than in the first three years but have not 
increased as much as the national 
average, leading to a wider gap in 
graduation rates between Michigan and the 
national average. 
B. Achievement of Vulnerable, Low-Income 
Students
As Michigan traverses the road toward K–12 excellence, the 
education and achievement of its most vulnerable students 
must be addressed. These children are from low-income 
families with fewer resources at home than more affluent 
families to help their children succeed in school. In this study, 
we follow the common practice of identifying these students 
as those students who qualify for the federal student lunch 
program. Using a student achievement index developed from 
the NAEP scores, the data in Table 3-2 indicate that Michigan 
is modestly below the U.S. average in test scores for both 
low-income and non-low-income students. The entries in the 
17The event dropout rate is not an ideal measure of students who leave high school without a credential, as it will count as dropouts students who transfer to 
another public school district, private school, or state- or district-approved alternative education program; students with a temporary absence due to suspension 
or school-approved education program; or deceased students. Nonetheless, it is straightforward to calculate for most districts and is readily historically available.
Table 3-1. Michigan and U.S. Dropout and Graduation Rates, by Year
SOURCE: Chapman et al (2011); Stillwell and Sable (2013); Stetser and Stillwell (2014).
                             Event Dropout Rate                         Average Freshman Graduation Rate
Academic Year  Michigan U.S. Gap Michigan U.S. Gap
2002–03 4.5 3.9 +0.6 74.0 73.9 +0.1
2003–04 4.6 4.1 +0.5 72.5 75.0 -2.5
2004–05 3.9 3.9 0.0 73.0 74.7 -1.7
2005–06 3.5 3.9 -0.4 72.2 73.2 -1.0
2006–07 7.4 4.4 +3.0 77.0 73.9 +3.1
2007–08 6.2 4.1 +2.1 76.3 74.9 +2.4
2008–09 3.8 4.1 -0.3 75.3 75.5 -0.2
2009–10 4.3 3.4 +1.0 75.9 78.2 -2.3
201 0–1 1  7.2 3.3 +3.9 75.0 80.0 -5.0




table correspond to an index that combines NAEP math and 
reading test score results for grades 4 and 8. In 2013, there 
is a 3.0 point gap for low-income students and 3.4 point gap 
for non-low-income students between Michigan and the U.S. 
state average. The change in this index between the years 
2003 and 2013 for Michigan trailed the change in the national 
average by 2.0 points for low-income students and 3.3 points 
for non-low-income students. The fact that the changes in 
Michigan are positive, but have lagged behind the changes 
for the U.S. state average, implies that Michigan’s academic 
achievement as measured by these tests has increased over 
the last decade, but at a slower rate than the U.S. average for 
both low-income and non-low-income students.18
One way to understand the significance of the differences 
in student achievement between students from low-income 
families and those who are not is to estimate the effect on 
future earnings. The test score gap for low-income students 
in Michigan or in the U.S. as a whole shown in Table 3-2 
suggests that the typical low-income student would have 
future earnings that are 18 percent lower than non-low-
income students, a differential that becomes quite large 
over an entire career. The test score gaps of 25.6 points 
Table 3-2. Michigan vs. U.S. Test Score Indices: 2013 Levels and 2003–13 Changes
for Michigan and 26.0 points for the U.S. are around three-
quarters of a standard deviation. In percentile terms, low-
income students in Michigan (U.S.) are at the 31.4 percentile 
(34.5 percentile), and non-low-income students are at the 
59.8 percentile (63.5 percentile). Drawing upon Chetty et 
al.’s (2011) findings that a 1 percentile change in test scores 
at grades 4 and 8 predicts adult earnings differentials 
of 0.642 percent at the overall adult earnings mean, the 
28.4-percentile disadvantage for low-income students in 
Michigan (29.0 for the U.S.) would be expected to cause 
an earnings differential of about 18 percent (28.4 × 0.642 ≈ 
18). Since the overall expected earnings differential between 
children from low-income families and non-low-income 
families is around 59 percent when evaluated at the overall 
earnings mean (Bartik 2014), these test score differentials 
alone can account for about 30 percent (18 ÷ 59) of the 
overall earnings disadvantage of low-income families.
Comparing individual MEAP test scores within the state of 
Michigan (rather than state-level NAEP scores) for low-
income students and non-low-income students gives similar 
results. Differences in average reading and math test scores 
from 3rd through 8th grade between low-income students 
18 In this and ensuing sections, we focus on the gaps in educational outcomes (as proxied by test scores) between low-income and non-low-income students. The 
definition of low-income is eligibility for free or reduced price lunch. These gaps are pervasive and economically significant, as documented below.
19 The average scale score differential between low-income and non-low-income students over reading and math MEAP tests in grades 3 through 8 in 2013 was 
20.25 points. As the MEAP is designed to have a standard deviation of 25 scale points, the differential corresponds to 0.81 standard deviations. In percentile 
terms, the average low-income student scores at the 33.6 percentile of the overall test score distribution, while the average non-low-income student scores at the 
65.0 percentile. This 31.4 percentile differential would be predicted, based on Chetty et al.’s (2011) results, to yield a 20 percent earnings differential, where the 
percentage is relative to the overall mean of earnings.
                                                          2013 Test Score Index                                    2003–13 Difference
   Low-Income      Non-Low-Income     Low-Income          Non-Low-Income
       Students                        Students                             Students                         Students
Michigan 237.3 262.9 6.0 5.2
United States  240.3 266.3 8.0 8.5
NOTE: Test score index is the simple average of scale scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress for 4th grade and 8th grade reading 
and math. The 2003–13 difference is the change from 2003 to 2013 in this test score index. 
SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
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Table 3-3. Ranking of States on NAEP Academic Performance Index
NOTE: The index is calculated using four inputs for each state: 1) the simple mean of average test score levels for low-income students in 2013 for 4th graders and 8th 
graders in reading and math; 2) the same simple mean of average test score levels but for non-low-income students; 3) the simple mean of average test score changes 
between 2003 and 2013 for low-income students, again for 4th and 8th graders in reading and math; and 4) this same simple mean of average test score changes for 
non-low-income students. Each of these inputs is expressed in standard deviation units relative to the national mean, where the standard deviation is across the 51 state 
observations of each input. The index then calculates a weighted average of these four inputs, with a double weight put on the test score levels and trends of low-income 
students. An equally weighted average yields similar rankings. SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
        Index of State Academic Performance,
                   Rank              State        2013 Levels and 2003–13 Changes
 1 New Jersey 1.29
 2 Massachusetts 1.24
 3 Maryland 1.21
 4 Florida 0.86
 5 Pennsylvania 0.86
 6 New Hampshire 0.83
 7 Indiana 0.80
 8 Georgia 0.58
 9 Vermont 0.54
 10 Washington 0.46
 11 Colorado 0.43
 12 District of Columbia 0.43
 13 Minnesota 0.40
 14 Tennessee 0.35
 15 Hawaii 0.34
 16 Wyoming 0.25
 17 Nevada 0.24
 18 North Carolina 0.19
 19 Texas 0.19
 20 Maine 0.15
 21 Rhode Island 0.11
 22 Ohio 0.09
 23 Wisconsin 0.08
 24 Kentucky 0.03
 25 Delaware 0.02
 26 Kansas 0.00
 27 Idaho −0.03
 28 Montana −0.06
 29 Arkansas −0.10
 30 Oregon −0.13
 31 Utah −0.16
 32 Nebraska −0.21
 33 Arizona −0.24
 34 California −0.27
 35 Virginia −0.28
 36 Connecticut −0.33
 37 Missouri −0.34
 38 Illinois −0.36
 39 Iowa −0.45
 40 North Dakota −0.51
 41 New York −0.54
 42 New Mexico −0.55
 43 Alabama −0.61
 44 Oklahoma −0.62
 45 Michigan −0.64
 46 Louisiana −0.84
 47 Mississippi −0.89
 48 West Virginia −1.03
 49 South Carolina −1.06
 50 South Dakota −1.07
 51 Alaska −1.07





and non-low-income students predict an earnings gap of 
about 20 percent.19
To provide a more comprehensive index of student 
achievement across states, we developed an index based on 
the four tests in 2013 and the change in test scores between 
2003 and 2013 for both low-income and non-low-income 
students. With this index, New Jersey and Massachusetts are 
clearly at the top of the list of states, as shown in Table 3-3, 
joined by Maryland. After that, there is a large gap in the index 
between Maryland and Florida, but indices for the next four 
states — Florida, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Indiana 
— are close in value. 
Michigan ranks 45th out of the 50 states and District of 
Columbia. This low ranking is attributable to Michigan scoring 
below almost all of the other states in test score levels or in test 
score changes, or — compared with leading states —both.
The seven top ranking states in the table, our “exemplary” 
benchmark states, have values of our constructed index 
that are well above all of the other states. Table 3-4 shows 
the same test score levels and changes for low-income and 
non-low-income students that are displayed in Table 3-2 for 
Michigan and for the U.S. average, but in this case the table 
Table 3-4. Michigan vs. Leading States’ Test Score Indices: 2013 Levels and 2003–13 Changes
shows data for Michigan and for those seven top ranking 
states. Note that Michigan is well behind these seven states in 
each of the four columns of the table. 
How do Michigan’s test score differentials across income 
groups compare to other states? Almost every state has 
large test score differentials between low-income students 
and non-low-income students. In the NAEP score index we 
have constructed, every state has scores for low-income 
students that average at least 16 percentiles lower than the 
scores for non-low-income students, and 40 of the 50 states 
(plus the District of Columbia) have test score differentials 
of at least 23 percentiles. Michigan’s test score differential of 
28.4 percentiles is slightly below the U.S. average differential 
of 29 percentiles.
States differ greatly in their overall academic performance, 
but if a state does better than the average state, it tends to do 
uniformly better for both low-income students and non-low-
income students, and if it does worse than the average state, 
it does worse for both income groups. Figure 3-3 shows the 
relationship between the average NAEP test score index for 
low-income students and non-low-income students by state. 
NOTE: Same sources as Table 3-2.
                                                                               2013 Test Score Index                               2003–13 Trends
    Low-Income Non-Low-Income Low-Income Non-Low-Income 
       Students                     Students                             Students                     Students
Michigan 237.3 262.9 6.0 5.2
New Jersey 245.5 272.3 14.5 10.8
Massachusetts 247.6 277.3 10.7 12.4
Maryland 243.5 270.3 15.5 13.5
Florida 244.8 267.0 12.8 10.2
Pennsylvania 243.5 269.0 13.0 10.0
New Hampshire 248.3 269.0 8.8 8.5
Indiana 246.5 267.5 10.5 9.0
Figure 3-3. Comparison of Non-Low-Income and Low-Income Test Score Levels
19
NOTE:Each point represents a state (including DC), and the red circle represents the U.S. average. The horizontal axis is the average NAEP 2013 
reading and math scores for 4th and 8th grade for non-low-income students; the vertical axis is the same for low-income students. Michigan, 
Massachusetts, DC, and the U.S. average are identified as data points. SOURCE: National Assesment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
With the exception of one outlier, the District of Columbia, 
which has unusually high scores for non-low-income 
students relative to low-income students, the relationship 
is quite strong, with a correlation of 0.62. Even including the 
District of Columbia, the correlation between this NAEP test 
score index for low-income and non-low-income students is 
0.52 and highly statistically significant.
However, Figure 3-3 shows that Michigan falls below the 
national average of test scores for both low-income students 
and non-low-income students. It is accompanied by 10 other 
states that are in the lower left-hand quadrant of the graph. 
Nearly 20 states fall into the upper right-hand quadrant of the 
graph, which indicates that their test scores are higher than 
the national average for both income groups of students. 
Massachusetts, for example, is clearly above the national 
average for both student groups, particularly for non-low-
income students.
Test score changes are also highly correlated across income 
groups. Across all states, the correlation in NAEP test score 
changes from 2003 to 2013 between low-income students 
and non-low-income students is 0.68 and highly statistically 
significant. Excluding DC, which once again is an outlier in 
having much stronger gains for non-low-income students, 
the correlation is 0.75. As Figure 3-4 on the next page shows, 
states tend to have either strong gains for both low-income 
and non-low-income students, or weak gains for both groups. 
Unfortunately, Michigan exhibits below average gains for both 
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Thus, some states do much better than Michigan in overall 
performance for both low-income students and non-low-
income students. But in nearly all states, the levels and gains 
of academic performance of both income groups are closely 
linked, so states do not differ dramatically in test score gaps 
or in progress in closing test score gaps. 
These results suggest that, regarding the issue of 
achievement gaps, the proverbial glass is half full, or maybe 
even three-fourths full. As a rule, states are not achieving 
much closure in the gap between low-income and non-low-
income students, but on the other hand, they are raising the 
overall achievement of both groups of students. If we were to 
portray the distributions of test scores for low-income and 
Figure3-4. Comparison of Non-Low-Income  and Low-Income Test Score Changes
NOTE:Each point represents a state, and the red circle represents the U.S. average. The horizontal axis is the average gain in NAEP test score for reading 
and math for 4th and 8th grade non-low-income students over 2003–13; the vertical axis is the same for low-income students. Michigan, Massachusetts, 
and the U.S. average are identified as data points. The District of Columbia is an extreme outlier and is not shown; it experienced a gain of 35.7 points for 
non-low-income students and a gain of 15.9 points for low-income students. SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
non-low-income students, we would likely see bell-shaped 
curves, with much of the low-income distribution to the 
left of the non-low-income distribution. The fact that the 
test score levels and changes are correlated across the two 
groups suggests that both bell curves are moving to the right. 
Unfortunately, Michigan’s progress for both these groups 
is behind the national average, and even more behind the 
leading states.
C. Interaction of District Level Poverty with 
Family Poverty
Studies show that students’ academic achievements are 
affected not only by their own income status, but also by the 
characteristics of their peers. We hypothesized an interaction 
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the percentage of low-income students in the district that 
the student attends. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
students who attend a district with a high concentration of 
low-income- students are at a disadvantage compared to 
low-income students in districts with less concentration of 
poverty. An examination of Michigan’s K–12 school districts 
shows strong evidence of this relationship. 
Figure 3-5 shows the negative relationship for Michigan 
school districts between the concentration of poverty in a 
district, measured by the percentage of students eligible for 
the free lunch program,20 and a composite of all MEAP test 
20In the analyses in this section of the report, we examine students eligible for free lunch, i.e., family income less than 130 percent of the poverty line, and do not 
include students eligible for reduced price lunch. 
21  The coefficient associated with the percentage on free lunch is −0.51 with a t-statistic of −34.8 and the coefficient associated with total revenue per student is 
0.00029 with a t-statistic of 2.12. 
results administered by the district. 
For each one percentage point increase 
in percentage of students on the free lunch 
program, the composite index of the percentage of 
students who are proficient on the tests declines by a half 
percentage point, even controlling for total revenue per 
student.21  
The same negative relationship is found when looking at 
the composite test results separately for students from 
low-income families and non-low-income families. As 
shown in Figure 3-6, test passing rates fall for both groups 
Figure 3-5. Relationship between Student Test Results and 
Concentration of Poverty in Michigan School Districts
NOTE: Each point represents 
a Michigan K–12 school 
district. Student test results 
are a weighted average of 
the percentage of students 
proficient in MEAP tests taken 
in 2010–2011 by students 
in a K–12 school district 
in Michigan. Tests include 
reading, math, writing, and 
science. The concentration 
of poverty is measured as the 
percentage of students in a 
district eligible for the free 
lunch program.
SOURCE: National 






as the percentage on the free lunch program increases. 
When student achievement is measured as the percentage 
of students proficient on the tests, the percentage falls 
faster for those not on the free lunch program than for 
those who are. When the scale score is used (not shown in 
the figures), only the low-income students are negatively 
affected by concentrated poverty in the districts they attend. 
The scale scores for non-low-income families do not vary 
with the percentage on the free lunch program. Therefore, 
the achievement gap between students in the two income 
Figure 3-6. Relationship between Student Test Results and the 
Concentration of Poverty in Michigan K-12 School Districts 
for Low-Income Students and Non-Low-Income Students
groups decreases with the percentage on the free lunch 
program when the percentage proficient is used, and the gap 
increases when the scale scores are used. 
This feedback loop, or interaction, between the academic 
achievement of low-income students and the concentration 
of poverty in a district amplifies the point that districts are 
unique and face different challenges. It suggests that a “one 
size fits all” funding scheme, even with the “one size fits all” 
section 31a at-risk categorical, will be far less adequate in a 
high-poverty district than in a district that has a small share 
NOTE: See the note for 
Figure 3-5. Each point 
represents a Michigan 
K–12 school district. The 
yellow dots present the 
percentage of non-
low-income students 
proficient on the MEAP 
tests, and the blue dots 
present the percentage 
of low-income students 
proficient on the MEAP 
scores. 
Free Lunch Percentage
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The previous chapter provides evidence that Michigan’s student achievement has suffered relative to the nation and especially relative to some exemplary states. This chapter will explore 
how resources affect student achievement and compare 
Michigan’s financing of education to other states.
A. State Revenues per Pupil
This first section of the chapter looks at the level of funding 
for K–12 education, by state. In order to meaningfully 
compare states that vary greatly in the number of students, 
the revenue data presented here is normalized on a per-pupil 
basis.
In 1992, prior to Proposal A implementation, Michigan was 
a leading state in terms of resource support for education. 
It ranked 10th in total revenue per student and, at the time, 
IV: K–12 Education Financing
the majority of funds came from local sources. In 1993, 63.2 
percent of the total state revenue for K–12 schools came 
from local sources, primarily the property tax, whereas 30.6 
percent came from the state and 6.2 percent came from 
federal sources. Contrast these statistics with those from 
2011, in which 31.0 percent was derived from local sources 
and 55.1 percent came from the state, with federal sources 
contributing the rest. (The 31.0 percent from local sources is 
somewhat misleading, however, because the state controls 
the rates of property taxes and the tax base in most districts 
is limited to non-homestead property.) 
Michigan’s rank among states in this statistic has dropped 
considerably. It was a high-support state prior to Proposal A, 
and even after Proposal A went into effect wit ranked as high 
as 6th. However, the last column in Table 4-1 documents the 
decline in the state’s ranking. As the table shows, prior to the 
Table 4-1. Total Per-Pupil Funding, Michigan and Nationwide State Average, 1994–2011
  Nationwide State 
Year Average Percentage Change Michigan Percentage Change Michigan Rank
1993–94 $5,923  $6,962  9
1994–95 6,162 4.04% 7,385 6.08% 8
1995–96 6,363 3.25 7,736 4.75 7
1996–97 6,622 4.07 7,971 3.02 7
1997–98 6,965 5.18 8,415 5.58 6
1998–99 7,393 6.15 8,533 1.39 9
1999–2000 7,852 6.21 8,916 4.49 11
2000–01 8,415 7.17 9,507 6.63 10
2001–02 8,800 4.58 10,131 6.56 11
2002–03 9,110 3.52 10,058 –0.72 14
2003–04 9,575 5.10 10,260 2.01 16
2004–05 10,138 5.88 10,489 2.23 19
2005–06 10,745 5.99 10,893 3.85 19
2006–07 11,417 6.25 11,369 4.37 20
2007–08 12,114 6.10 11,591 1.95 24
2008–09 12,472 2.96 11,799 1.79 25
2009–10 12,690 1.75 11,765 –0.29 26
2010–11 12,752 0.49 12,266 4.26 23




2006–07 school year, the total per-pupil funding in Michigan 
exceeded the state average nationwide; but since that year, 
the state’s level of funding has been less than the nationwide 
average. The entries in the table are totals of state, local, 
and federal funding sources. The relative decline in Michigan 
might be characterized as precipitous. In the eight years 
between 1993–94 and 2001–02, per-pupil funding in 
Michigan exceeded the national average by more than 
$1,000 per student. Over the next four years, the difference 
shrank considerably, becoming negative in 2006–07.  
The switch from local to state funding was more dramatic 
in Michigan than in all but one other state. As shown in 
Figure 4-1, the shift by states from local to state funding or 
state to local funding was fairly balanced during the period 
described above. Eighteen states shifted toward more state 
funding, whereas 21 states shifted toward more local funding. 
However, for most of the states the shifts were relatively 
small, with three exceptions, of which Michigan was one. 
For Michigan, the share of local funding declined by 33 
percentage points; New Hampshire’s share of local revenue 
declined by the same amount. Vermont’s share of local 
funding fell from 62.1 percent in 1993 to 7.6 percent in 2011, 
a decline of 55 percentage points. Concomitantly, the state 
share of funding in Vermont  rose from 32.7 percent to 81.7 
percent. 
According to Downes (2004), who conducted a careful 
analysis of Vermont’s funding mechanism and the process 
by which the legislature arrived at a new method, the 
subsequent legislation was “as much about property tax 
relief as it was about school finance reform” (p. 286). Cullen 
Figure 4-1. Percentage Change in Local and State Shares of 
Per Student Financing, 1993–2011, by State
NOTE: The horizontal axis is 
the percentage change in the 
share of per-student revenue 
from local sources between 
1993 and 2011. The vertical axis 
is the percentage change in the 
share of per-student revenue 
from the state between 1992 
and 2011.
SOURCE: Common Core Data, 
National Center for Education 
Statistics.












Figure 4-2. Percentage Change in State Share and Total
Revenue Per Student Financing, 1993–2011, by State
NOTE:The horizontal axis is the 
percentage point change in the 
share of per-student revenue 
from the state between 1993 
and 2011. The vertical axis is 
the percentage point change 
in (nominal) total revenue per 
student between 1993 and 
2011.
SOURCE:Common Core Data, 
National Center for Education 
Statistics.
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and Loeb (2004) suggest that Michigan’s education financing 
reform in 1994 was similarly motivated by the desire for 
property tax relief, as Michigan’s property tax burden at the 
time was the seventh highest among the states (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1992).
Vermont’s radical change in the way it financed K–12 
education came about from a State Supreme Court ruling 
in 1997. In response to plaintiffs who claimed that property-
poor school districts in the state could not afford the same 
educational opportunities to students, the Supreme Court 
stated that the existing system deprived “children of an 
equal educational opportunity in violation of the Vermont 
Constitution” (Brigham v. State 1997, 166 Vt. at 249).22 The 
Supreme Court left it to the state legislature to find a way 
to comply with its ruling. Vermont’s approach to finance 
reform was to combine elements of foundation and power 
equalization mechanisms. Vermont legislation established 
a statewide property tax, and a portion of the foundation aid 
was funded through that tax. The power equalization part of 
the funding mechanism ensured that localities with the same 
nominal tax rates would have the same levels of education 
spending. 
Does the share of funding from state and local sources make 
a difference in the overall level of revenue per student? Most 
22Cited in Downes (2004).






















states have made some changes in the share of revenue 
from local and state sources to fund K–12 education. Some 
states have changed their funding mechanisms with the 
purpose of reducing differences in per-pupil revenue across 
school districts in their state and to increase the overall level 
of funding, with a minimum increase in the tax burden on 
local taxpayers. We examined whether there was a significant 
difference in funding per student in states that made these 
changes. As shown in Figure 4-2 on the previous page, there 
is no obvious relationship between the change in the share of 
state funding (expressed in percentage point terms) and the 
change in per-student total revenue at the state level. What 
is noticeable is that Michigan’s percentage increase in per-
student total revenue is among the lowest during this time. 
Only Oregon, Arizona, and Florida had percentage increases 
Figure 4-3. Percentage Change in per Student Total Revenue 
and in K–12 Student Enrollment, 1993–2011, by State
NOTE: The horizontal axis is the 
percentage change in a state’s 
student enrollment between 
1992 and 2011. The vertical 
axis is the percentage change 
in (nominal) total revenue per 
student between 1992 and 
2011.
SOURCE:Common Core Data, 
National Center for Education 
Statistics.
 
smaller than Michigan’s (nominal) 60 percent gain between 
1993 and 2011. The average increase among the states and 
the District of Columbia during that time was 79 percent, with 
a minimum of 55 percent (Florida) and a maximum of 111 
percent (Wyoming). 
An interesting relationship holds between the growth in total 
revenue per student and the growth in student enrollment 
during this period. As shown in Figure 4-3, those states 
(and the District of Columbia) with higher enrollment 
growth experienced lower per-student total revenue growth. 
Michigan’s K–12 student enrollment fell one percentage 
point between 1993 and 2011. However, the 12 other states 
with declines in enrollment outpaced Michigan with a greater 
increase in total revenue per student.
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During the past two decades, Michigan was one of a small 
handful of states that shifted the major source of revenue 
for schools from local areas to the state. Of that small 
sample, Michigan had, by far, the smallest growth in per-pupil 
revenue. Furthermore, over that time frame, most states 
experienced enrollment growth; however, 
Michigan did not. Of the states that had 
enrollment losses, Michigan was 
again at the bottom of the pack 
in terms of growth in per-pupil 
revenue. Clearly, over this 
time frame, Michigan was 
not able to hold its own in 
terms of resource support 
(revenue) per student. 
Recognizing that the level of 
school aid is determined by 
the governor and legislature, 
we nevertheless believe that 
Michigan’s lagging support was 
mainly a matter of affordability 
and not a political choice. The 
political decision makers were 
hamstrung by Michigan’s problems with its 
fiscal capacity, as will be described in the next section.
B. Michigan’s Fiscal Capacity and Types of 
Expenditure
The resources that any state has available to fund K–12 
education depend upon two key factors: the size of the tax 
base and the rate at which the state taxes that base. As 
described in the previous section, the tax base for Michigan 
changed dramatically with Proposal A, moving from heavy 
reliance on local taxes to a higher percentage of state 
funding. Nonetheless, the tax base is still a combination 
of local property and items subject to a state sales tax. 
Therefore, in order to compare the resources available and 
the tax effort expended across states for K–12 education, two 
measures are used. The first is gross state product (GSP), 
which is the broadest measure of the capacity of a state’s 
economy to support K–12 education. Although GSP does 
not capture the stock of capital, of which property could 
be considered a component, for 
property to be valuable and contribute 
to the tax base it must be used for productive 
purposes, which are captured in GSP. The second 
measure is the revenue generated from local and state 
sources (not federal) to fund K–12 education. 
A useful tautology is to divide revenue 
per student into three components: 
1) revenue per GSP, 2) GSP 
per capita, and 3) total state 
population per pupil. Revenue 
per GSP is a measure of 
effort relative to capacity 
— how much of the state’s 
GSP is going toward K–12 
education. GSP per capita 
is considered the revenue 
capacity of a state. The ratio of 
the total state population to the 
number of students is essentially a 
demographic characteristic of a state 
that indicates how broadly educational 
resources must be spent. Lower values of this 
ratio — equivalent to higher numbers of students per 
person in a state — mean that a state’s population must 
educate relatively more students, holding constant the state’s 
fiscal capacity (GSP per capita). Multiplying together the three 
components yields revenue per pupil. This tautology offers 
a convenient way to examine which of the three may explain 
differences across states in the funding of K–12 education on 
a per-pupil basis. 
Education Week (2015) graded all 50 states plus the District 
of Columbia on school finance issues. This analysis used two 
fiscal components. First, for fiscal capacity, it relies on real 
GSP per capita — the same measure for fiscal capacity as 
described above. The second measure is real state and local 
revenue per student. Dividing real state and local revenue per 
student by real GSP per capita yields the measure of fiscal 
effort times population per student — the third component 
listed in the previous paragraph. 
During the past two 
decades, Michigan was one 
of a small handful of states 
that shifted the major source 
of revenue for schools from 




Table 4-2. Gross State Product, State and Local Educational Revenue, 
and Indices of  Effort and Capacity in 2012, by State
Alabama $44,617 $9,672 87.2 86.8 100.5%
Alaska   76,135   14504 130.7 148.1 88.3
Arizona   42,233    7,373 66.4 82.1 80.9
Arkansas   46,060   10,764 97.0 89.6 108.3
California   49,494    8,250 74.3 96.3 77.2
Colorado   52,850    9,181 82.7 102.8 80.5
Connecticut   61,848   16,372 147.5 120.3 122.7
Delaware   64,646   13,443 121.1 125.7 96.4
DC 149,678   22,626 203.9 291.1 70.0
Florida   40,292    8,019 72.3 78.4 92.2
Georgia   48,028   10,220 92.1 93.4 98.6
Hawaii   44,437   10,350 93.3 86.4 107.9
Idaho   38,987    6,849 61.7 75.8 81.4
Illinois   54,363   12,823 115.6 105.7 109.3
Indiana   51,522   12,045 108.5 100.2 108.3
Iowa   56,919   12,449 112.2 110.7 101.4
Kansas   53,560   11,916 107.4 104.2 103.1
Kentucky   45,752   10,253 92.4 89.0 103.8
Louisiana   59,763   11,381 102.6 116.2 88.2
Maine   40,743   12,581 113.4 79.2 143.1
Maryland   51,375   13,563 122.2 99.9 122.3
Massachusetts   60,626   14,803 133.4 117.9 113.1
Michigan   44,670   11,779 106.2 86.9 122.2
Minnesota   56,872   12,551 113.1 110.6 102.3
Mississippi   39,376    8,661 78.1 76.6 101.9
Missouri   50,770   11,380 102.6 98.7 103.9
Montana   44,506   10,435 94.0 86.6 108.6
Nebraska   61,646   12,265 110.5 119.9 92.2
Nevada   47,576    8,671 78.1 92.5 84.5
New Hampshire 47,135  13,202 119.0 91.7 129.8
New Jersey   52,280   16,632 149.9 101.7 147.4
New Mexico   45,111    9,586 86.4 87.7 98.5
New York   56,710   18,034 162.5 110.3 147.4
North Carolina   50,640    8,181 73.7 98.5 74.9
North Dakota   78,280   12,973 116.9 152.2 76.8
Ohio   53,268   13,767 124.1 103.6 119.8
Oklahoma   49,987    8,457 76.2 97.2 78.4
Oregon   54,572    9,870 88.9 106.1 83.8
Pennsylvania   49,998   14,975 135.0 97.2 138.8
Rhode Island   49,743   14,675 132.2 96.7 136.7
South Carolina   41,542   10,824 97.5 80.8 120.7
South Dakota   59,533    9,620 86.7 115.8 74.9
Tennessee   47,899    8,491 76.5 93.2 82.1
Texas   58,178    9,342 84.2 113.1 74.4
Utah   48,657    7,062 63.6 94.6 67.3
Vermont   44,997   16,311 147.0 87.5 168.0
Virginia   52,687   10,271 92.6 102.5 90.3
Washington   54,922   10,026 90.4 106.8 84.6
West Virginia   42,406   14,109 127.1 82.5 154.2
Wisconsin   51,146   12,412 111.9 99.5 112.5
Wyoming   75,296   17,467 157.4 146.4 107.5
     
U.S. Average  $ 51,419   $11,097 100 100 100%
NOTE: Column (1) has per-capita GSP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) adjusted by state cost of living from the BEA. Column (2) has per-student state and local 
revenue from U.S. Census Bureau (2014) adjusted by state cost of living. Column (3) is an index of column (2) with the U.S. average at 100; column (4) is an index of column (1) 
with the U.S. average at 100. Column (5) is column (3) divided by column (4) in percentage terms.
Real GSP per Capita
(1)






Index of Revenue Effort
Relative to Capacity
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These measures are shown in Table 4-2, with the two 
measures of GSP per capita and revenue per student 
expressed as an index and revenue effort expressed as the 
ratio of revenue per student to GSP per capita. The Education 
Week article ranked Michigan 23rd among the states. One of 
the criteria used in determining this grade was “percent of 
taxable resources spent on education (2012).” At 3.8 percent, 
Michigan was above the national average of 3.4 percent (in 
fact, Michigan had the 12th highest percentage). The data 
used to proxy for “taxable resources” in the Education Week 
rankings was GSP. In Table 4-2, we show Michigan’s fiscal 
capacity using the same data as Education Week, except 
that we have converted the individual state revenue and GSP 
into real dollars, using a state-level cost adjustment from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Michigan is near the bottom quintile of states in GSP per 
capita at $44,670 (ranks 41st) and concomitantly in the 
revenue capacity index at 86.9 percent (this statistic may 
be interpreted as indicating that Michigan’s GSP per capita 
is about 13 percent below the national average.). By this 
measure, Michigan is well below all of its competitor states 
in the North Central region of the country — Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Despite such a low resource 
base, Michigan is in the middle of the pack (25th) in per-pupil 
(state plus local) revenue at $11,779. Not surprisingly then, 
Michigan’s index of effort relative to capacity is relatively 
high (ranked 11th). The bottom line is that, as measured by 
GSP per capita, Michigan is a relatively poor state, and yet it 
continues to fund education relatively well. 
 
The importance of a strong economy for financing K–12 
education can be illustrated by considering how an increase 
in GSP per capita might affect state and local revenue 
per pupil. Consider the effect on state and local revenue 
per pupil if Michigan’s economy was equal to the national 
average — $51,419 per capita, without changing any other 
factors that affect the generation of revenue, such as overall 
fiscal effort. Such an improvement 
in the state economy — which is not 
an unreasonable scenario since Michigan’s 
real per capita GSP around the year 2000 was 
approximately equal to the national average — would 
generate an additional 15 percent in revenue from state and 
local sources, bringing Michigan’s ranking in revenue to 14th 
position from 25th. State and local revenue per student 
in this case would be 122 percent of the national average, 
offering nearly $2,000 more revenue dollars per student to 
support education. Obviously, if GSP per capita for Michigan 
were even higher, so would be the revenue available for 
education. Unfortunately, in the short run, there is not much 
that state government can do about the current economy, 
but in the long run investment in education can be a stimulus 
in putting the economy on a higher growth path. (See Bauer 
et al., 2006.).
Another factor that figures heavily in the generation of state 
and local revenue for K–12 education is fiscal effort. This is 
defined as state and local revenue as a percentage of GSP 
and is related to the willingness of state residents to tax their 
income to support government activities, and then more 
specifically to direct those funds to education. Table 4-2 
shows the fiscal effort as an index pegged to the national 
average. Michigan’s fiscal effort is 122 percent of the national 
average, which places it 11th among the states. If the effort 
were intensified to be more like the fiscal effort of New York 
and New Jersey, two of the exemplary states identified earlier, 
state and local revenue per student would grow from $11,779 
to $14,205, providing nearly $2,500 more per student. This 
hike in fiscal effort would place Michigan at 128 percent of the 
national average.
From a fiscal viewpoint, the state’s role in K–12 education is 
to provide revenue; districts determine how the revenue gets 
spent. An important category of expenditure is instructional 
expenses.23 The average state share of revenue spent 
23Chakrabarti and Roy (2012) provide justification for why this fiscal statistic is important. Basically, they argue that it is a proxy for school district productivity. 
They furthermore cite U.S. Department of Education (2009), a communique that explicitly asked school districts to invest Title I dollars in improving instruction, 




on instruction is a little over 50 percent. Table 4-3 shows 
the percent of revenue spent on instruction for the years 
1993–94 and 2011–12 for the 50 states and DC. There is not 
a great deal of variation by state; in the latter year of data, 
the national average is 52.6 percent and the minimum and 
maximum are 39.3 percent (DC) and 62.6 percent (NY), 
respectively. However, this seems to be an expenditure 
category for which Michigan is relatively weak. It ranked 
44th in 1993–94 and 40th in 2011–12. Note that benefits 
for current employees are included in this figure, although 
pension and health benefits for retired personnel are not. It 
should also be noted that capital costs for charter schools 
are included in (non-instructional) operating expenses, which 
may tend to depress the instructional percent of spending.
We examined several general categories of non-instructional 
expenditures, which constitute approximately half of 
the budget. Michigan’s expenditures on general district 
administration and school building administration are 
relatively low compared to other states (in the bottom one-
third of states in both cases). Furthermore, expenditures on 
operations and maintenance are particularly low in 2011–12, 
ranking 47th and dropping from 32nd in 1993. On the other 
hand, Michigan’s expenditures on student support services 
and other support services are relatively high (top fifth of 
states). Student support services comprise guidance, school 
health, hearing, and speech specialists. Other support 
services include business offices and data processing (not 
instructional IT support). Instructional support services 
(training, media centers, audio/visual) and professional 
and technical support services (legal, accounting/auditing, 
rentals) are in the middle of the pack.
Benefits to employees in Michigan are relatively high. In 
1993, the state paid, on average, $1,244 in benefits per pupil. 
This was the 9th highest level of benefits among the states, 
and it ranked 10th in terms of benefits as a share of total 
expenditures. By 2011, the cost of employee benefits per 
student had increased to $2,786,24 which is 15th highest 
among the states but 6th in terms of benefits as a share of 
total expenditures. Note that these benefits are for current 
employees only and do not include pension or retirement 
health benefits. When measured as the ratio of employee 
benefits to total salaries for instructional personnel (teachers 
and aides), the state ranked third, with a share of 53 
percent. Only West Virginia and Alaska ranked higher by this 
measure. The relatively high costs in Michigan are caused 
by relatively high salaries that naturally increase the cost 
of benefits that are tied to salaries including payroll taxes 
and pension contributions. The latter are inflated by the 
necessity of covering the unfunded liabilities in the Michigan 
State Professional Employee Retirement System (MPSERS) 
defined benefit pension and retiree health benefit plans.
In summary, Michigan spends a relatively high share of 
its fiscal capacity on education. However, when we look at 
national data at how expenditures are made, we see that 
Michigan is among the highest states in terms of per-pupil 
employee benefits, student support services, and other 
support services. It is among the lowest states in terms of 
per-pupil instructional spending.
 
A policy option might be to try to shift spending from non-
instruction-related items to instruction-related categories. 
Among the non-instruction-related categories, Michigan is 
already ranked toward the bottom of states in administrative 
and operations and maintenance expenses. That leaves the 
option of trying to tackle benefit costs, which is difficult to do 
and could be counterproductive if that makes it difficult to 
retain and attract qualified teachers. Nonetheless, the state 
is addressing these issues with its move toward a defined 
contribution pension system and, at the district level, with 
early retirement incentive packages.
C. District Expenditures per Pupil
The prior section gives a “macro” picture of the funds 
available to districts, i.e., their revenue, on a state-by-state 
basis. That section documents Michigan’s slide at the state 
24This is $1,790 in 1993 dollars, which implies that there has been a real increase in benefit costs of 44 percent per pupil over the period between 1993 and 2011.
Table 4-3. Share of K–12 Revenue Spent on 
Instruction in 1993–94 and 2011–12, by State




1993–94 Share of Revenue
Spent on Instruction
2011–12 Share of Revenue
Spent on Instruction 1993–94 Rank
Alabama 54.4% 52.1% 31 24
Alaska 41.9 49.3 51 43
Arizona 47.3 46.2 49 50
Arkansas 55.3 49.6 24 41
California 51.8 51.1 43 31
Colorado 53.7 48.2 35 47
Connecticut 59.6 57.8  4  8
Delaware 59.4 58.2 5 4
DC 47.0 39.3 50 51
Florida 49.3 55.3 48 14
Georgia 55.4 53.6 23 19
Hawaii 54.4 50.3 32 37
Idaho 56.3 52.6 16 23
Illinois 55.7 50.8 21 33
Indiana 53.1 48.5 38 45
Iowa 56.8 50.7 11 34
Kansas 55.0 50.7 26 35
Kentucky 55.8 52.1 20 25
Louisiana 54.6 53.1 29 21
Maine 60.3 55.5 3 12
Maryland 56.3 55.3 15 15
Massachusetts 55.1 57.7 25 9
Michigan 51.4 49.7 44 40
Minnesota 56.3 53.8 14 18
Mississippi 56.1 50.1 19 39
Missouri 52.9 51.2 39 30
Montana 58.4 54.9 9 16
Nebraska 55.4 55.9 22 11
Nevada 52.1 52.0 41 26
New Hampshire 58.7 60.2 8 2
New Jersey 53.2 56.4 36 10
New Mexico 50.9 47.9 47 48
New York 62.2 62.6 2 1
North Carolina 56.7 58.2 12 5
North Dakota 56.6 48.3 13 46
Ohio 53.9 49.5 34 42
Oklahoma 52.0 48.7 42 44
Oregon 54.3 51.7 33 28
Pennsylvania 57.7 52.9 10 22
Rhode Island 64.6 58.1 1 6
South Carolina 52.1 46.9 40 49
South Dakota 56.3 51.0 17 32
Tennessee 56.2 59.7 18 3
Texas 51.0 50.6 45 36
Utah 54.9 51.8 27 27
Vermont 59.4 53.4 6 20
Virginia 53.2 54.4 37 17
Washington 50.9 51.4 46 29
West Virginia 54.7 58.0 28 7
Wisconsin 58.8 55.3 7 13
Wyoming 54.6 50.2 30 38
    
U.S. Average 54.8 52.6  





Table 4-4. Median District Current Expenditures per Pupil and 90th–10th Percentile 
District Gap in Current Expenditures per Pupil, 2010–11, by State
Alabama $8,613 43 27% 6 131
Alaska 20,315 1 149% 50 39
Arizona 7,558 49 42% 23 91
Arkansas 8,847 38 36% 13 239
California 8,295 45 57% 39 397
Colorado 8,694 39 51% 34 130
Connecticut 14,832 6 32% 9 115
Delaware 11,862 14 47% 30 16
District of Columbia 18,475 2 0% 1 1
Florida 9,021 35 25% 3 67
Georgia 9,098 34 36% 12 178
Hawaii 12,004 13 0% 1 1
Idaho 7,103 50 67% 46 87
Illinois 9,464 28 46% 29 394
Indiana 8,649 42 41% 19 289
Iowa 9,131 32 26% 5 314
Kansas 10,034 23 41% 18 247
Kentucky 9,109 33 32% 10 169
Louisiana 10,519 20 55% 38 72
Maine 13,080 11 43% 25 96
Maryland 13,135 10 28% 7 24
Massachusetts 12,778 12 46% 28 211
Michigan 8,914 37 37% 14 500
Minnesota 9,523 27 40% 17 304
Mississippi 8,238 46 47% 31 148
Missouri 8,309 44 42% 24 386
Montana 11,554 16 63% 44 18
Nebraska 11,222 19 48% 32 174
Nevada 9,796 24 89% 49 16
New Hampshire 13,996 8 54% 36 65
New Jersey 14,851 5 52% 35 220
New Mexico 10,201 22 83% 47 70
New York 17,608 3 66% 45 627
North Carolina 8,684 40 38% 16 115
North Dakota 10,505 21 61% 43 73
Ohio 9,590 25 41% 21 607
Oklahoma 7,805 47 43% 26 359
Oregon 9,222 30 41% 22 140
Pennsylvania 11,462 18 45% 27 494
Rhode Island 13,773 9 38% 15 31
South Carolina 8,940 36 55% 37 83
South Dakota 8,657 41 57% 40 105
Tennessee 7,566 48 25% 4 122
Texas 9,135 31 49% 33 849
Utah 6,800 51 88% 48 40
Vermont 14,069 7 58% 41 30
Virginia 9,567 26 36% 11 130
Washington 9,406 29 41% 20 209
West Virginia 11,852 15 22% 2 55
Wisconsin 11,476 17 28% 8 354
Wyoming 16,548 4 59% 42 43
NOTE: Gap is per-pupil expenditure for district at the 90th percentile in the state divided by per-pupil expenditure for the district at the 10th percentile in the state, expressed as 
a percentage.
SOURCE: Common Core Data System, NCES.
Median District Expend.
per Pupil Rank Gap Rank
Number of
DistrictsState
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level over the past decade, and it documents how the shift 
in funding mechanism undertaken with Proposal A placed 
Michigan in a small subset of states that had major changes 
over the past two decades. In this section, we examine 
expenditures by districts on a per-pupil basis.
The Common Core Data system from NCES contains 
financial data for each local education agency (LEA) in the 
country. The database includes over 19,000 LEAs, although 
not all of these are K–12 districts. Some are intermediate 
school districts, charter schools, or educational institutions 
for students with special needs. Others are districts that 
may cover only elementary schools or only high schools. 
This section examines data from LEAs that are considered 
to be traditional school districts (including districts with 
associated charter schools) that have both elementary and 
secondary education. In the analysis, we have excluded as 
outliers one very large district (New York City) and several 
very small districts. We eliminated the latter by setting an 
arbitrary target of enrollment sufficient to have 20 students 
in each grade 1 through 12, a total of at least 240 students. 
We excluded New York City because of its sheer size of nearly 
a million students. We also eliminated districts with zero or 
unreported current expenditures. With these restrictions, our 
sample includes 9,675 K–12 districts. 
 
For this sample, the average current expenditure per student 
in the most recent year available (2010–11) is $10,663, and 
the average student enrollment is 4,510 students.25The 
variation is quite large, particularly in enrollment, which 
ranges from a low of 241, just over the cutoff point, to a high 
of 667,273 (Los Angeles Unified School District). Current 
expenditures per student range from a low of $647 to a high 
of $50,462. The school district with the highest per-student 
expenditure in the sample is a small district in New York 
25About 80 percent of the districts in our sample include preschool expenditure and enrollment data. The mean per-pupil expenditures for districts with (without) 
preschool is $10,466 ($11,297); the mean enrollment for districts with (without) preschool is 4,746 (3,685). 
26Michigan is ranked 24th according to total expenditures on current operations of all local education agencies in the state divided by total student count 
(Cornman, et al., 2013). The difference between the measure presented here and the total expenditures on current operations per student is that the former 
excludes expenditures on education by agencies that are not included in our list of K–12 districts. This includes intermediate school districts, schools devoted to 
students with specific needs or opportunities, and charter schools. It also excludes Detroit Public Schools, which is the largest district in the state and spends 
$13,415 per student. Leaving that school district out of the calculation of total expenditures per student for the state will lower the state’s ranking in that category, 
although other states are in similar situations..
State. There are six other districts 
with current expenditures per student 
above $40,000 and they are small districts 
located either in New York or Alaska.
Table 4-4 lists the current expenditures per student for the 
median K–12 district (in terms of per-pupil expenditures); 
the difference, in percentage terms, between the total 
current expenditures per student for the district at the 90th 
percentile and the district at the 10th percentile in each 
state’s distribution of expenditures per pupil; and the number 
of districts in each state. Note that the ranking for the 
difference in the gap between the 90th percentile and 10th 
percentile districts goes from smallest to largest.
Alaska is clearly an outlier among the states. It has by far 
the highest median current expenditure per student, but 
also it has the largest gap in spending between the 90th and 
10th percentile districts, with a difference of 149 percent. 
The District of Columbia, as a single, large urban district, 
is also apparently an outlier in terms of expenditures per 
student, with almost $18,500. Note that Utah and Idaho, 
with median expenditures per pupil of around $7,000, are 
significantly lower than all other states. Ignoring the single-
district cases of Hawaii and DC, West Virginia has the least 
disparity in spending, according to the gap measure, with 
only a 22 percent difference between the 90th and the 10th 
percentile district. Consistent with the data on state-by-state 
comparisons of spending, Michigan is relatively low in the 
median expenditure measure, where it is ranked 37th.26 Its 
median district spends $8,914 per student. However, the gap 
in per-pupil spending between the 90th percentile district 
and the 10th percentile district — at 37 percent — is relatively 
small, with Michigan ranked 14th.




Alabama 1 1 0 0 0 0
Alaska 1 1 1 0 0 0
Arizona 0 1 1 0 0 1
Arkansas 1 1 0 0 0 0
California 1 0 0 0 0 0
Colorado 1 0 1 0 0 0
Connecticut 1 0 1 0 0 0
Delaware 0 0 1 0 1 0
District of Columbia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Florida 1 1 1 0 0 0
Georgia 1 1 1 0 0 0
Hawaii 0 0 0 1 0 0
Idaho 0 0 0 1 0 0
Illinois 1 0 0 0 1 0
Indiana 1 0 0 1 0 0
Iowa 1 0 0 0 0 0
Kansas 0 1 1 0 0 0
Kentucky 1 1 0 0 1 0
Louisiana 1 0 1 0 0 0
Maine 1 1 0 0 0 0
Maryland 1 1 1 0 0 0
Massachusetts 1 0 0 0 0 0
Michigan 1 0 0 0 0 0
Minnesota 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 1 1 0 0 0 0
Missouri 1 1 0 0 0 0
Montana 1 0 1 0 1 0
Nebraska 0 0 1 0 0 0
Nevada 1 0 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 1 0 0 1 0 0
New Jersey 1 0 1 0 0 1
New Mexico 0 0 1 0 0 0
New York 1 0 1 0 0 0
North Carolina 1 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ohio 0 0 1 0 0 1
Oklahoma 1 0 1 0 0 1
Oregon 1 1 1 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 1 1 1 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 1
South Carolina 1 1 0 0 0 1
South Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0
Tennessee 0 1 1 0 0 0
Texas 1 1 0 0 0 0
Utah 1 0 0 0 0 0
Vermont 0 0 0 1 0 0
Virginia 1 1 1 1 1 0
Washington 0 1 0 1 0 0
West Virginia 1 1 0 0 0 0
Wisconsin 0 1 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 1 0 0 0 0 0






Funding Flat Grant Other
Mean/median current exp/student  $  10,808  10,020  11,874  9,789  9,833 
Mean (or median) enrollment 4,822  4,973  4,600  4,837  4,647 
Share of district revenue from:     
   Local 41.6 39.9 44.6 31.5 41.2
   State 46.9 46.4 44.2 58.6 47.4
   Federal 11.5 13.6 11.2 9.8 11.4
Property tax 72.4 72.6 75.6 70.8 76.9
Percent black 9.5 10.9 8.3 5.9 8.8
Percent free or reduced price lunch 39.0 42.6 36.1 36.9 39.6
(# districts, # states) (7504, 37) (4429,23) (4045, 22) (811,7) (727, 5)
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from its trimmed version of Common Core Data System, National Center for Education Statistics.




States finance K–12 education in several ways: 
n Foundation: State guarantees minimum amount of 
funding for each school district; requires districts to 
raise local portion of this amount
n Local equalization effort: State guarantees that for 
any given level of local taxation effort a district will 
receive equal yield
n Equalization: State accounts for property wealth, 
taxation effort, and relative district need to 
determine funding levels
n Full state funding: State requires that state provides 
all money needed for basic education
n Flat grant amount: State uniformly allocates dollars 
per student or instructional unit. 
n Other: Other type of funding plan
According to EdCounts, the research arm of Education 
Week, the funding mechanisms adopted by the states and 
the District of Columbia can best be described according to 
Table 4-5. There is some overlap in classification of financing 
Table 4-6. Descriptive Statistics about Districts, by State Financing Type
schemes for some states; that is, they 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
As shown in the table, 37 states use a foundation grant 
approach, whereas 23 use local equalization and 22 use 
equalization. The remaining 12 use either full state funding 
or flat grant. Of those using a foundation approach, 17 also 
use local effort equalization, 15 use equalization, and 7 use 
either full state funding or flat grant. While the foundation 
grant approach dominates, the other mechanisms are used 
in combination with that approach.
How, if at all, does the funding mechanism of a state 
influence the financing in the state? As displayed in Table 
4-6, current expenditures per student vary across states 
that use different funding schemes. The 22 states that have 
adopted an equalization approach have the highest average 
per-student expenditure, whereas the seven states that use 
full state funding have the lowest per-student expenditures. 
Not surprisingly, those same seven states that use full state 
funding rely the most on state revenue and rely the least on 









To explore the effects of state policies and the use of 
revenue sources, we examine those groups of states that 
are considered to follow a particular policy and compare the 
variance in district revenues within a state to the variance 
across states. For example, for those 23 states classified as 
using local effort equalization as a financing policy, the within-
state variance is 60 percent higher than the between-state 
variance, whereas for the remaining 28 states (and DC) that 
do not use local effort equalization, the within-state variance 
is only 17 percent higher. The variance decomposition 
suggests that this method of financing, in which the state 
subsidizes districts so the same tax rate can generate the 
same revenue, yields a much larger share of the variance due 
to within-state differences relative to cross-state differences, 
as compared with states that do not use that financing 
method. Higher within-state variance is also found for the 
share of state revenue to local districts, which also suggests 
that the use of state funds to help individual districts within 
the state generate the same revenue with equal tax effort. 
In contrast, states that have not adopted a policy of local 
equalization effort financing have higher variance in the share 
of state revenue across states than within states.
E. Financing Mechanisms in Exemplary States 
Chapter 3 identified seven exemplary states based on levels 
and trends of student achievement, both for all students as a 
whole and for low-income students. We focus on the funding 
mechanisms in these states (in alphabetical order).
Florida. As noted in Table 4-3, Florida has a complex 
system of funding that relies on a foundation grant, local 
effort equalization, and equalization. The foundation grant 
is referred to as the base student allocation, and is a little 
over $4,400 for 2014–15. State funding is determined by 
multiplying the allocation by a weighted measure of full-
time equivalent (FTE) students. Several factors are used to 
weight the FTEs, almost all of which are intended to capture 
differences in costs.
Among the factors that increase the weighted FTEs are 
“sparsity” of the district; grade levels; declining enrollment; 
and enrollment of students in special education, gifted 
and talented programs, and English for Speakers of Other 
Languages (ESOL). The sparsity factor is intended to adjust 
for the relatively higher operating costs of smaller districts. 
FTEs in grades K–3 increase FTE weights by 8.9 percent, and 
FTEs in grades 9–12 increase FTE weights by 3.1 percent. 
Districts with declining enrollment get an increased weight, 
and finally, the state has a complex system for weighting 
special education, gifted and talented, and ESOL FTEs. 
In addition to the state funding, local districts are allowed 
to levy up to 0.748 mills for operating expenses, and with a 
supermajority, may levy an additional 0.250 mills for critical 
operating or capital outlay expenditures. The local levy is 
equalized at the state average per unweighted FTE. 
In short, Florida places considerable weight on cost 
differentials, and allows local districts to raise their own funds 
through a state-equalized property tax levy.
Indiana. Legislators and policymakers in Indiana are 
currently debating whether the state’s school funding system 
over- or undercompensates for the cost of educating low-
income students (Wang 2014). Local school corporations or 
charter schools are mainly funded by the state grant, which is 
determined by a foundation funding amount multiplied by an 
adjusted average daily membership (ADM). The foundation 
funding amount in 2015 is about $4,600. The adjustment to 
the ADM is a multiplier determined by the count of students 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. This multiplier is 
called an adjusted complexity index, and it is calculated by 
multiplying the percentage of students on free or reduced 
price lunch by about one-half,27 and then adding that to 1.0. 
So, for example, if a school district has about 50 percent of its 
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, its adjusted 
complexity index would be approximately 1.25.
27The exact multiplier is 0.4974.
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Beginning in 2012, an adjustment was instituted based on 
enrollment size. This adjustment was zero for schools with 
an ADM of less than 500 in the previous school year; $150 
for schools with an ADM of between 500 and 1,000; and 
$150,000 divided by the previous-year ADM for schools with 
an ADM greater than 1,000 students.
This adjusted foundation funding amount is modified further 
by a “transition to foundation” calculation. If the funding 
amount is approximately equal to the foundation grant value, 
there is no modification. Otherwise, the modification to the 
funding amount is approximately plus or minus 15 percent of 
the difference between it and the foundation grant value, so 
that districts move toward equalization. Over and above this 
modified, adjusted basic state grant are state funds allocated 
for honors diplomas, special education, career and technical 
education, and full-day kindergarten. Also, transportation 
services and building improvements are funded through 
separate local tax levies. In 2009, the state disallowed the use 
of local levies for operating expenses. Unlike traditional public 
schools, charter schools receive no local property tax funding 
for capital projects or transportation.
In summary, the funding philosophy in Indiana heavily 
weights the level of low-income student enrollment, and 
otherwise leans toward full state funding and eventual 
equalization.
Maryland. The finance system in Maryland, which was 
reformed in 2002 as the Bridge to Excellence program, is a 
foundation grant system that has a local equalization feature. 
The legislature based its foundation grant on the results of 
an adequacy study, and by fiscal 2015, the grant has risen to 
a level of $6,860. The funding is intended to be split equally 
between the state and local districts. The total general 
education support for the state equals the foundation grant 
multiplied by FTE enrollments. One-half of this is the state 
share. The other half is the local share, which is allocated 
by the share of statewide property wealth held in a district. 
The state share then is the residual between the local share 
and the foundation grant. In wealthy 
districts, the local share per student may 
exceed the foundation, and so the state share 
would theoretically be set at 0. However the Bridge to 
Excellence program set a minimum of 15 percent for the state 
share.
Maryland has an equalization program, the Guaranteed Tax 
Base Program, which provides state funding to local districts 
with average property wealth per pupil less than 80 percent 
of the statewide average. It also adjusts funding based on the 
geographic cost of education and provides additional funds 
to districts that do not receive at least a 1 percent increase in 
state aid. 
The state pays the entire cost of pension/retirement benefits 
for eligible school personnel.
Maryland also has significant funding for special education 
students, compensatory education (low-income) students, 
and English language learning students. The supplemental 
funding for these students are 74 percent, 97 percent, and 99 
percent of the foundation grant, respectively. For example, a 
student eligible for free or reduced price lunch would have a 
funding level of 1.97 times the foundation grant. 
In summary, Maryland has a foundation grant that was 
originally set by an adequacy study. The foundation grant is 
intended to be equally met with local tax revenue, although 
the local share is equalized with state funds. The foundation 
grant has an adjustment for differential costs by geographic 
area. Finally, the state has quite significant supplemental 
funding for special education, compensatory (at-risk) 
education, and English language learners.
Massachusetts. Like Maryland, Massachusetts has a 
foundation grant system, and the funding is shared between 
the state and local school districts. Unlike other states with a 
foundation grant system, Massachusetts actually has several 




foundation budget is derived by multiplying the enrollment 
in 14 categories by cost rates in 11 functional areas.28 The 
enrollments are pupil counts as of October 1 of the previous 
school year and are classified into the following 10 categories:
n Regular education or special education 
n Regular or special education half-day kindergarten
n Regular or special education full-day kindergarten
n Regular or special education elementary (grades 
1–5)
n Regular or special education junior high/middle 
(grades 6–8)
n Regular or special education senior high (grades 
9–13)
n Limited English pre-kindergarten
n Limited English half-day kindergarten
n Limited English (grades 1–12)
n Vocational education
Increments are added to the foundation grants for students 
who fall in one of the following three categories:  in-district 
special education, out-of-district special education, and low-
income status (eligible for free or reduced price lunch). Pre-
school and half-day kindergarten program enrollments count 
as 0.5 FTEs. The functional areas are as follows:
n Administration
n Instructional leadership
n Classroom and specialist teachers
n Other teaching services
n Professional development
n Instructional equipment & technology
n Guidance and psychological
n Pupil services
n Operations and maintenance
n Employee benefits/fixed charges
n Special education tuition
Each pupil generates a specific cost in each of these 
functional areas. The costs are higher at the elementary 
and upper grades (FY2015 costs per elementary student 
are $7,353; per middle school student, $6,971; and per high 
school student, $8,693), and higher for limited English and 
vocational programs. Special education and low-income 
students have higher costs as well. The FY2015 increment for 
low-income students in grades 1–8 is $3,422 and in grades 
9–12 is $2,767.
A wage adjustment factor is used for districts in a geographic 
area where average wages are higher than in other areas of 
the state.
The local share of the cost is determined by the district’s 
share of total property wealth in the state and total income 
in the state. The state pays the difference between the 
foundation budget and the local share. Charter school tuition 
rates are based on the foundation budgets calculated for 
each sending district’s pupils. Charter school tuition is the 
name of the state payments to the charter school; they are 
not payments required from students to attend.
In short, the funding mechanism in Massachusetts is 
intended to split the costs between the state and the local 
district. Furthermore, it is based on cost differentials, takes 
account of variation in wealth among districts, and has a very 
high (relative to other states) support level for low-income 
students.
New Hampshire. New Hampshire has a relatively 
straightforward foundation grant system. It is intended to 
be based on a cost of adequacy and will be adjusted every 
two years by the Consumer Price Index-Urban consumers, 
Northeast Region, for “services less medical care services.” 
In FY 2014, the foundation grant base was $3,498. That base 
is raised by $1,719 for students who are eligible for free or 
reduced price lunch, $1,882 for special education students, 
$648 for English language learners receiving English 
instruction, and $648 for each 3rd grade pupil not proficient 
in the reading component of the state assessment and not 
eligible for the other adjustments.
28This system was designed by a committee of school district superintendents and a consultant economist in the early 1990s (Moscovitch 1992). The costs were 
intended to constitute “an adequate — but not excessive — level of funding.”
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The state determines the total state support for school 
districts and notifies each municipality annually about how 
much it needs to raise in property tax. Municipalities send 
that portion of their property tax receipts directly to school 
districts.
New Jersey. This state’s funding mechanism is based on 
the School Funding Reform Act of 2008. It is a foundation-
based formula with district equalization. In recent years, 
the aid has not been fully funded because of budgetary 
constraints. 
 In FY 2011, the per-pupil foundation grant was $9,971. This 
grant is multiplied by a weighted projected student count 
to determine a district’s adequacy budget. The weights are 
0.50 for half-day kindergarten; 1.0 for full-day kindergarten 
through grade 5; 1.04 for grades 6–8; and 1.17 for grades 
9–12. County vocational students are given a weight of 1.31. 
Students eligible for free or reduced price lunch increase 
the relevant grade level weight by an additive factor of 0.47 
to 0.57, depending on the low-income concentration in 
the district. The 0.47 factor applies for districts where the 
concentration of low-income students is no more than 20 
percent, and the 0.57 factor applies for districts where the 
concentration of low-income students is at least 60 percent; 
interpolated factors apply for districts within this range of 
low-income concentration. English language learners garner 
an additional weighting factor of 0.50 if they are not low-
income, and 0.125 if they also qualify for the low-income 
supplemental weight. Special education students are 
provided higher foundation grants depending on actual costs.
On average, local districts’ tax levies cover about 25 percent 
of the total per-pupil aid, although this percentage varies 
considerably. For districts that have relatively low income and 
wealth, the state provides equalization aid to cover the per-
pupil adequacy budget. The state contributes to the teachers’ 
pension fund, pays the employer share of Social Security 
taxes, and supports the cost of post-
retirement medical benefits for retirees.
In general, New Jersey has a foundation grant system 
that weights students in middle school more than those 
in elementary school, and students in high schools more 
than those in middle school. The state has a fairly large 
supplement for low-income and LEP students — on the 
order of $5,000 per student. Local communities are able to 
support school budgets above and beyond the foundation 
grant.
Pennsylvania. In 2006, the Pennsylvania legislature 
directed the State Board of Education to conduct an 
adequacy study to determine the “basic cost per pupil that 
will permit a student to meet the state’s academic standards 
and assessments.” The base cost in the 2010–11 fiscal 
year was $8,950. A district’s allocation equals that base 
cost multiplied by a grade-level modified ADM. Half-day 
kindergarten is weighted at 0.50; elementary students are 
weighted at 1.0; and secondary students (grades 7–12) are 
weighted at 1.36.
The state has poverty and English language learner 
supplements. The poverty supplement is the product of the 
base cost and the number of students eligible for free or 
reduced price meals, multiplied by 0.43. The English language 
learner supplement is the number of students identified as 
limited English proficiency (LEP), multiplied by the product of 
the base cost and a factor dependent on ADM.29
The state also has a district size supplement and an 
adjustment for geographic price differences. The size 
supplement is the greater of zero or the product of the base 
cost, the ADM, and ADM-dependent adjustment factor.30 The 
geographic price difference is based on a cost metric.
29 The ADM factor is: 3.753 − 0.23 × ln (ADM), where ln() refers to the natural log. The effective factor is subject to a minimum of 1.48 and a maximum of 2.43.




Summary. Table 4-7 summarizes several characteristics 
of the fi nancing mechanisms from the states just described 
and for Michigan. Michigan, Florida, and Indiana all have 
approximately the same level of instructional expenditure 
per pupil; whereas the other fi ve states in the table have 
the resources to spend considerably more per pupil 
for instruction. Four of the states base their support 
on adequacy studies, and in each of those states, the 
instructional support per student was over $8,000 in 2011. 
All of the states except Florida provide additional revenue for 
at-risk (or low-income) students. Note that Michigan’s level of 
support, through the 31a categorical, is much lower than that 
of other states that support at-risk students. Furthermore, 
Michigan requires such students to be eligible for free meals, 
Table 4-7. Summary Characteristics of State Finance Mechanisms
not reduced-price meals. The level of support in Michigan 
is also constrained by a pro-ration. The language of the 
categorical indicates that the per-student support should be 
11.5 percent of the foundation grant, which in 2013–14 would 
have been about $815. 
All of the states in the table except Michigan31 have extra 
support for English language learners (in addition to the 
funding for at-risk students). In most of the states, this is 
available only to LEP students who are not eligible for at-risk 
funding. Four of the states adjust funding by grade level. All 
four of these weight high school highest; three weight middle 
school higher than elementary school, and the other weights 
elementary school higher than middle school. One of the 
states, Florida, adjusts support for declining enrollment.
31 Some districts in Michigan off er instruction for English language learners. However, the documentation that we could fi nd suggested that this was done on a 
reimbursement basis from federal funds. 
Characteristic MI FL IN MA MD NH NJ PA
Instructional expenditure per pupil (2011) $5,791 $5,511 $5,445 $9,280 $8,712 $8,793 $10,131 $8,020
Based on adequacy study No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Support for at-risk students (incremental $)  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 (≈ $600)  (≈ $2,200) (≈ $2,500 (≈ $6,500) (≈ $1,750) (≈ $4,700 (≈ $3,800)
    – 3,000)   – 5,700) 
Support for LEP students (incremental $) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  (14.7% of per  (≈$90) (7–34% of (99% of  ($685) (50% of (≈$35)
  pupil grant)  per pupil  per pupil  per pupil  
    grant dep.   grant)  grant)
     on grade)
  
Grade-level adjustment No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes
Declining enrollment adjustment No Yes No No No No No No
Adjustments for intrastate price diff erences No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Adjustment for district size No Yes Yes No No No No Yes
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Three of the states use price or wage differentials to adjust 
local support, and three adjust the support for enrollment 
size. As noted, Michigan does not make any of these 
adjustments other than to provide extra funding for at-risk 
students. Michigan fails to adjust funding for many cost 
factors that exemplary states take into account. Even the 
adjustment that Michigan does make for at-risk students is 
much smaller. The state’s virtual “one size fits all” approach 
is out of step with the leading states in terms of student 
achievement.
F. The Cost of Closing the Gaps in Michigan’s 
Student Achievement
1. Overall Student Achievement
We start with the question of whether academic performance 
can be increased by simply spending more money. Our 
empirical work suggests that money does make a difference. 
Figure 2-1 displays the relationship between results on the 
MEAP and revenue per pupil in Michigan after the passage of 
Proposal A. The regression line that fit those data suggested 
that an increase of $1,000 in revenue per pupil translated 
to an increased MEAP passing rate of about 1.5 percentage 
points. If we assume that the results from the MEAP can be 
transformed to the NAEP, then the “good news” is that for 
Michigan to match the U.S. average educational performance 
it would take “only” an extra $2,000 per pupil in school 
funding.32 
Using MEAP results offers a good understanding of the likely 
impact of increasing per-pupil revenue: not only is it specific 
to the Michigan context, but the sudden and unexpected 
large changes in per-pupil revenue in certain districts make 
it easier to isolate the effects on achievement of greater 
money from any other policy differences across districts. 
The changes in Proposal A funding 
per student by district can be viewed as 
being a true natural experiment. 
These MEAP results suggest that money, as it is typically 
spent, matters. From a benefit-cost standpoint, these results 
are somewhat encouraging. An extra $2,000 or so per 
pupil, or around $30,000 over the entire K–12 period, would 
move Michigan’s academic performance up to U.S. levels, 
which would increase future earnings by about 2 percent, 
or about $30,000 over an entire career. Of course, these 
future earnings would have to be discounted somewhat to 
reflect that a dollar 30 years from now is worth less than a 
dollar today. However, the policy might pass a benefit-cost 
test if we include other benefits of education other than 
increased earnings. Some of these benefits include private 
nonmonetary benefits, such as improved health and self-
image or greater reading enjoyment, and public nonmonetary 
benefits, such as improved civic participation, less criminal 
activity, and greater social cohesion.
Still, these results are discouraging in terms of policy 
proposals to solve educational disadvantages by 
simply spending more money. Even erasing the modest 
disadvantage that Michigan has relative to the U.S. average 
would require spending $2,000 extra per pupil per year. To 
match a leading state such as Massachusetts would require 
spending closer to an extra $10,000 per pupil.33
2. Gaps between Low-Income and Non-Low-Income 
Students
The levels of additional funding that would be needed to 
overcome the extremely large performance differentials 
between low-income students and non-low-income students 
are so large that simply trying to overcome the gap by 
32 We assume a uniform percentile increase in student performance. The coefficient of 0.00146 times a $1,000 increase in per pupil funding will increase the MEAP 
pass rate by 1.46 points. If this corresponds to a uniform percentile increase in all students’ performance, then for Michigan to match the U.S. advantage of 3.1 
percentiles for low-income students, and 3.4 percentiles for non-low-income students, it would take higher spending of $2,123 for low-income students (= 3.1 
percentiles ÷ 1.46), and $2,329 for non-low-income students (= 3.4 percentiles ÷ 1.46). 
33 Massachusetts, as reported in Table 3-4 above, has an advantage in the NAEP over Michigan of 11.1 percentiles for low-income students and 14.7 percentiles for 
non-low-income students. Dividing this by the 1.46 implied percentile effect of an extra $1,000 in per pupil funding yields an implied requirement that funding per 




investing more resources precludes serious contemplation. 
We estimate that it would require directing to low-income 
students more than double the current level of total spending 
in districts with the average percentage of low-income 
students.34 This is consistent with a broader research 
literature on how much needs to be spent to overcome 
performance gaps between low-income students and non-
low-income students. This research literature frequently 
implies that the required extra spending is at least doubling 
spending per student (Golebiewski 2011; Duncombe and 
Yinger 2005). The gaps between school districts consisting 
almost entirely of low-income students, versus districts with 
almost no low-income students, imply that we would need 
to spend perhaps four times the current level per pupil in the 
former districts to eliminate the gap.35 It seems safe to say 
that such increases for low-income students are infeasible.
But even though it is infeasible to close the test score gaps, 
keeping the gaps from growing — that is, to achieve similar 
academic progress for both income groups — will ultimately 
result in a more equitable income distribution. Similar test 
34 If each $1,000 of extra spending increases performance by 1.46 percentiles as estimated in the regression reported in Figure 2-1, then the 28.4 percentile gap 
between low-income and non-low-income students in Michigan on the NAEP would require extra spending of $19,452 (= $1,000 × 28.4 percentiles ÷ 1.46). Similar 
calculations suggest that the 31.3 percentile gap in the MEAP between low-income students and non-low-income students would be overcome with an extra 
$21,507 in spending. 
35 As shown previously, the percentile gap between 100 percent low-income school districts and 0 percent low-income school districts is about 60.9 percentiles. 
The implied extra required spending is $41,712 (=$1,000 × 60.9 ÷ 1.46).
The test score gains for low-income students move them from the 26.5 percentile to the 34.5 percentile of the 2013 test score distribution, a gain of 8 percentiles. 
36 The test score gains for non-low-income students move them from the 54.0 percentile to the 63.4 percentile of the 2013 test score distribution, a gain of 9.4 
percentiles. Based on Chetty et al. (2011), these percentile gains should be multiplied by 0.642 to predict percentage earnings gain as a percent of average adult 
earnings, which yields 5.1 percent for low-income students and 6.1 percent for non-low-income students. But expected future earnings of low-income students 
are 71.4 percent of overall average earnings, whereas expected earnings for non-low-income student are 130.1 percent of overall average earnings (Bartik 2014). 
Therefore, the percentage boost for low-income students as a percent of their expected future earnings is 7.2 percent (= 5.1 ÷ 71.4), and percentage boost for non-
low-income students is 4.7 percent (= 6.1 ÷ 130.1).  
score gains for low-income and non-low-income students will 
have similar dollar effects on adult earnings, on average, for 
both groups. But because low-income students on average 
have lower expected future earnings as adults than non-
low-income students, these similar dollar gains have much 
larger percentage effects on future earnings. The earnings 
distribution becomes more equal when we add similar dollar 
future earnings to all income groups. 
For example, as shown in Table 3-2, the gain in Michigan’s 
NAEP score index for low-income students and non-low-
income students was similar, at 8 points for low-income 
students and 8.5 points for non-low-income students. This 
test score gain would be expected to result in similar dollar 
gains in future earnings, which would be about 5–6 percent of 
overall average earnings. But as a percentage of the expected 
future earnings of both groups, this test score boost would 
be expected to boost future earnings of low-income students 
by 7.2 percent, versus 4.7 percent for non-low-income 
students.36
 




The analyses of the extra resources needed to close gaps 
at the end of the previous chapter simply look at the 
educational performance effects of spending money without 
regard to exactly how that money is spent. However, certain 
educational practices are known to more effectively raise 
student achievement rather than simply increasing school 
funding across the board. Reducing class size in early 
elementary school is expensive, but it has 
a larger effect per dollar on academic 
achievement and later outcomes 
than aggregate increases in 
school funding (Krueger 1999). 
High-quality child care from 
birth to age 5 is also very 
expensive, but, dollar-for-
dollar, it has been shown 
to improve outcomes for 
disadvantaged students 
more than a general increase 
in K–12 funding (Bartik 2014). 
High-quality child care and 
preschool are cost-effective 
because these early interventions 
take place when children’s brains 
are more malleable. Preschool can be 
especially effective, as children can be taught 
in larger class sizes than in early childhood, lowering costs. 
Preschool has also been shown to be effective for both low-
income students and middle-class students, whereas child 
care seems to make a significant difference only for low-
income students (Bartik 2014). 
High-quality summer school for students who are behind 
grade level is also a high-productivity activity if students 
can be motivated to engage in summer school, as it targets 
students who are behind and focuses on their specific 
V: Policy Recommendations
academic deficiencies (Jacob and Lefgren 2004). High 
school career academies that provide high-quality career and 
technical education in small learning communities have also 
been shown to be quite cost-effective in improving student 
outcomes, although these studies apply only to students 
interested in career and technical education (Kemple 2008). 
Studies of effective charter schools for low-income students 
suggest that schools that lengthen the school year 
and use small group tutoring with high 
expectations for every student have 
much better academic results (Fryer 
2012). Targeted math tutoring and 
counseling for students who are 
behind has also been shown 
to be very cost effective in 
improving student outcomes 
(Cook et al. 2015).
Table 5-1 on the next page 
summarizes the implications 
of these studies for the 
relative costs and future 
economic benefits of various 
educational policies. Simply 
increasing education spending 
across the board has future earnings 
benefits that are somewhat less than costs, 
although the addition of non-pecuniary benefits (such 
as better health or reduced crime) might make this benefit-
cost ratio exceed one. In contrast, there are many specific 
economic policies that target particular grades, particular 
groups of students, or particular educational practices, and in 
each case have economic benefit-to-cost ratios that greatly 
exceed one. Given its limited fiscal capacity, Michigan needs 
to focus any increases in educational resources on these 
policies and practices with a higher educational impact per 
dollar.
Michigan needs 
to focus any increases 
in resources on 
policies and practices 
with a higher educational 
impact per dollar.




Thus, our first recommendation is that the state should 
conduct a competitive grant program that we have dubbed 
the Smart Educational Expenditure Demonstration (SEED) 
program. Grants should go to traditional districts or charter 
schools that implement an educational practice that has 
been shown to be effective, such as the ones in the table. 
The practices that get funded should be limited to teaching 
and learning; that is, they should preclude non-instructional 
Table 5-1. Future Economic Benefits and Program Costs of Various Educational Policies
activities. We realize that Michigan does not currently 
have a considerable level of resources to use to increase 
its investment into education, but we suggest that a $200 
million grant program may be feasible, especially given the 
potential benefits relative to costs. If an effective intervention 
has an average cost per student of $4,000, then a four-
year commitment to the SEED grants will serve 200,000 
students. We also feel that this program can help shrink the 
Policy
General school funding effects
Full-time full-year child care   
   from birth to age 5 (Educare)     
   for disadvantaged families
Reduced class-size K–3
Universal full-day pre-K
High school career academies
Mandatory elementary summer 
   school for one year for     
   children who are behind
One hour per day math tutoring  
   plus cognitive behavioral         
   therapy for disadvantaged 9th  
   graders
Five best school practices         
   (longer school year & school   
   day, small group tutoring,         
   frequent feedback to teachers, 
   more use of testing to guide     
   instruction, high expectations)




































Students interested in CTE
Students who are 
academically behind
Students who are 
academically behind
High-poverty schools
NOTE: Costs and benefits are discounted back to year intervention would begin. Costs and benefits are measured in year 2012 dollars. The social discount rate used is 3 
percent. Future earnings are assumed to increase in real terms by 1.2 percent per year. Earnings effects are calculated either directly, or from test score impacts, based on 
Chetty et al. (2011).
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achievement gap, so we recommend reserving two-thirds of 
the grants for districts or charter schools with a large share of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price meals.
Recommendation #1. The state should implement a 
four-year competitive grant program for districts (traditional 
and charter schools) to offer services/interventions that 
have been shown to be highly effective at increasing student 
achievement. The districts that receive grants will be required 
to evaluate the efficacy of their service/intervention.37 A 
funding level of $200 million for this Smart Educational 
Expenditure Demonstration (SEED) initiative will serve 
200,000 Michigan students. Two-thirds of the grants should 
go to districts or charter schools with enrollments of over 50 
percent of students eligible for free or reduced-price meals. 
Intermediate school districts (i.e., regional education service 
agencies) could both assist local districts (traditional and 
charter) in preparing applications for the competitive grant 
and in conducting the evaluations.
B. Local Enhancement Millages 
An important result of Proposal A was to improve funding 
equity across districts. Prior to 1994, the majority of district 
funding came from operating millages on local property 
approved by the district’s voters. In many locations, these 
millages were often hard to pass or, if they did pass, did not 
raise significant funds because of modest property values. 
Having the state provide a larger share of funding meant 
a more robust source of revenue for these locations. The 
improved funding equity among districts that Proposal A 
brought is laudable, and the system worked well for its first 
few years because the state’s economy was relatively strong, 
and legislators continued to increase the foundation grant.
However the state’s economy has stagnated so that its fiscal 
capacity is quite limited. We believe that it is time to loosen 
the straitjacket of Proposal A and allow local districts to raise 
additional revenue through voter-approved local millages. 
37 Note that the Michigan Department of Education Program Evaluation Tool could be used for this evaluation or districts that receive a grant could use an 
alternative, if it were at least as rigorous.
These supplemental millages would 
restore to an extent communities’ 
opportunities to support their schools. In order 
to promote equity across districts, we propose that 
these millages be equalized by the state. We furthermore 
would provide the revenue that gets raised per student to 
charter schools located in the district. 
We have performed simulations of various equalization 
schemes and millage caps, but it is unclear how many 
districts would pass a supplemental millage. If the cap is 
set at 3.0 mills and the state guarantees that local districts 
will receive at least as much funding per pupil per mill as 
the district at the 80th percentile of taxable property value, 
then approximately $750 million of additional revenue would 
get injected into the system (about $600 million from local 
property tax supplemented by $150 million from the state).
What can be done to increase the chances that any such 
increased resources will be used for practices that have 
a high educational achievement impact? Democratic 
accountability due to local voting helps provide one incentive 
for higher productivity activities, but we recommend that the 
state should require local districts to provide voters with the 
following information prior to the millage vote:
n how the supplemental funds will be used to 
supplement not supplant other funding
n targeted student achievement gains from the 
programs or practices to be funded
n how changes in student achievement will be 
measured 
Recommendation #2. Proposal A should be altered to 
allow local districts to approve enhancement millages for 
operating purposes of up to 3.0 mills per year for a maximum 
of five years. The state should supplement approved millages 





Many states have undertaken adequacy studies. Aportela 
et al. (2014) review 39 studies conducted in 24 states since 
2003, and this count of studies omits from consideration 
an important type of adequacy study referred to as an 
econometric cost function approach. Michigan is about to 
join the ranks of states with adequacy studies as it enacted 
P.A. 555 of 2014, which was signed by the governor on 
January 15, 2015. This law calls for an adequacy study to be 
completed by March 31, 2016. 
Undertaking an adequacy study is an investment, so it needs 
to yield benefits that justify the cost. From our viewpoint, 
the major advantage to such a study is that it would provide 
decision-makers with necessary information. It is highly 
unlikely that the managerial decision-makers at any firm or 
enterprise that produces a good or service are unaware of 
the cost of production of that good or service. Furthermore, 
firms know the costs of each component of the process 
of production. Yet, the educational system in Michigan 
is a complex, multi-output enterprise that has very little 
information about the cost of production. We do not know the 
cost of producing an adequately educated student in each 
grade. We do not know the cost of additional services that 
might be necessary for at-risk or otherwise disadvantaged 
students. We have no idea if the expectations that we have for 
students in terms of achievement of knowledge and skills are 
realistic given the level of resources that are provided. 
Many of the adequacy studies that have been conducted 
rely on professional judgments about the resources 
required to provide an adequate education. We believe that 
determination of adequacy should use an econometric 
analysis of costs in addition to a qualitative approach. (See 
Gronberg et al. 2004; Gronberg et al. 2011; Duncombe and 
Yinger 2011). 
Recommendation #3. The adequacy study mandated 
by P.A. 555 should include an econometric analysis of cost 
data as well as qualitative data from experts concerning what 
constitutes best practice. 
D. At-Risk Students
Michigan lags behind most other states in the achievement of 
and funding for at-risk students. Furthermore, our analyses 
show that when we proxy for at-risk status with eligibility 
for free lunch, at-risk students’ danger of falling behind 
on achievement is related to the concentration of at-risk 
students in the district. Higher percentages of low-income 
students in a district result in lower student achievement 
for such students than average, and districts with lower 
percentages of at-risk students have higher than average 
results for the at-risk population. It is as if a low-income 
student faces double jeopardy if he or she resides in a district 
that has a high percentage of such students. 
Michigan has a vehicle for providing more funds to districts 
for at-risk students, the Section 31a categorical, but relative 
to other states, this categorical is significantly underfunded 
and provides an equal level of per-pupil support no matter 
the share of the district’s students that are low-income. 
Given our analyses of student achievement, the need for 
at-risk funding is greater the higher the percentage of at-risk 
students in a district. Hence we advocate an allocation of 
Section 31a funds in a progressive manner, i.e., one that 
grants a greater per-student amount in districts that have a 
greater concentration of at-risk students. 
As a first step toward more appropriate support for at-risk 
students, the state should increase the budget for this 
categorical by $200 million. Half of that increase would bring 
the total state support to about $415 million. The remainder 
would support a weighting system where per-at-risk-pupil 
support would be weighted by 1.0 plus 0.5 times the free and 
reduced price lunch enrollment percentage in the district. 
This weighting scheme would allow more resources to go to 
districts with higher percentages of at-risk enrollment.
Recommendation #4. The state should increase its 
funding level and institute a progressive funding structure 
for aid for at-risk students (the section 31a categorical). To 
account for the pernicious effects of concentrated poverty, 
these funds should be allocated to districts with a formula 
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that provides a larger per-student amount in districts 
that have higher shares of at-risk students. Michigan’s 
current extra funding for low-income students is very low 
compared to the practices of states that are outpacing it 
in educational achievement gains. Its funding practices 
need to change, both to increase overall achievement and 
to provide for greater equity in opportunities. We propose 
weighting the per-pupil at-risk funding level by (1 + 0.5) 
times the percentage of free and reduced price lunch eligible 
enrollment in a district. 
E. Declining Enrollment
A well-known shortcoming of a foundation grant system is 
the fi nancial hardship that it places on a district that has 
declining enrollment. When a student leaves the district, 
the full value of the foundation grant is lost in revenue, but 
the district’s costs decline only by the marginal cost of the 
student, which is generally less than the full value of the 
foundation grant. If the enrollment decline is substantial 
or prolonged, it may start a vicious downward spiral—
declining enrollment causes less revenue and higher costs 
per (remaining) student. The higher costs per student may 
ultimately cause cost cutting and declines in quality, which 
may lead to further declines in enrollment.
CRC (2015) suggests that using a blended student count 
over three years will alleviate this problem. That may be a 
reasonable policy solution. In general, smoothing dollar fl ows 
over time helps to overcome temporary “shocks.” However, 
we suggest that another solution would be an adjustment 
to a district’s state aid payment that accounts for declining 
enrollment. If a district that lost enrollment were to receive 
the diff erence between the foundation grant and the marginal 
cost of instruction for each student lost, then the services 
it could provide per student would remain constant, thus 
preventing the downward spiral. Unfortunately, the marginal 
cost for each student is uncertain. However, in most cases it 
is unlikely to exceed half of the foundation grant. Therefore, 
we recommend that if a district’s 
enrollment drops substantially (by more 
than 2 percent), the state should supplement 
the district’s foundation grant support in the current 
year with a fl at payment equal to one-half of the foundation 
grant times the net enrollment loss.38 Michigan is projected to 
lose approximately 20,000 students between 2013–14 and 
2015–16. If half of those annual losses were in districts where 
the declining enrollment was more than 2 percent, then this 
supplemental aid would total approximately $20 million.
Recommendation #5. For districts that have declines in 
enrollment of more than 2 percent in a year, state aid should 
include an adjustment for declining enrollment that equals 
one-half of the foundation grant times the net enrollment loss.
F. Grade-Level Adjustments to the Foundation 
Grant
Research on class size suggests that smaller class sizes are 
especially important in early elementary grades. Because 
more teachers are needed, maintaining smaller classes 
early on suggests that costs will be higher for early grades 
than for later elementary grades. To the extent that revenue 
should refl ect cost diff erentials, one would expect states to 
provide more revenue per student in the early elementary 
grades. Indeed, this is done in 13 states: Alabama, Arizona, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and 
South Carolina.
The other grades where costs are relatively high occur in high 
school. In grades 9–12, districts must pay for lab equipment, 
more expensive instructional materials, and more specialized 
teachers. When one compares funding in grades 9–12 with 
funding in grades 4–8, we fi nd that 11 states weight students 
in the former grades more heavily than those in the latter: 
Alabama, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
38 One reason why a declining enrollment supplement is better than a three-year blended student count is that it would not penalize a district with rapid growth, 
where the marginal cost of additional teachers, classrooms, and transportation may exceed the average cost. A potential downside would be if it allows districts to 




Carolina, and Utah. An additional advantage to providing 
more funding on average to high school students is that it 
gives districts a stronger incentive to prevent students from 
dropping out of high school.
Implementation of these adjustments can be done without 
changing the total amount of state aid by using weights 
bigger than 1.0 for students in grades K–3 and 9–12 in 
determining state aid and weights that are less than 1.0 for 
students in grades 4–8. The advantage of these adjustments 
is that revenue will more closely align with costs. The 
disadvantage is that it will re-allocate funding with “gainers” 
being districts with a higher proportion of students in early 
elementary and high school grades and “losers” being 
districts with a relatively lower proportion of students in 
those grades. The latter may include urban districts with 
higher dropout percentages. 
Recommendation #6. Michigan should alter Proposal A to 
provide adjustments to the per-student foundation grant that 
weights more heavily enrollments in grades K–3 and grades 
9–12.
These six recommendations recognize the constraints 
imposed by the state’s fiscal situation. They call for a 
modest increase in state support, but they also suggest that 
resources can be brought to bear from local property wealth 
in those districts that wish to increase their commitment to 
education. Resources spent on policies and practices that 
have research-based evidence of effectiveness can generate 
large positive impacts.  
We believe that these recommendations will be a modest 
first step along the road to K–12 educational excellence in 
Michigan.
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